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Conventional wisdom provides that injunctive relief in public law cases
is generally unnecessary, because a declaratory judgment and the threat of
damages are enough to induce the government to comply with a court’s
ruling (except, perhaps, in the institutional reform context). Consistent with
this prevailing understanding, most scholars to apply Calabresi and
Melamed’s Cathedral framework to public law have concluded that nearly
all constitutional rights are protected by property rules, regardless of
whether a rightholder actually is protected by an injunction, or instead
merely has a substantial likelihood of obtaining one if she goes to court.
This Article challenges this prevailing understanding, including past
attempts to apply the Cathedral framework to constitutional rights. It
argues that a constitutional or statutory right receives the greatest available
level of protection when it is secured by an injunction. A court’s decision
about whether to issue an injunction is likely to make the biggest difference
in protecting a public law entitlement where: (i) high transaction costs
otherwise may deter or prevent rightholders from enforcing their rights
(such as where administrative exhaustion requirements exist or the
threatened violation is “fast moving”); or (ii) the benefits of violating the
right will accrue primarily to politically influential people or groups, while
violations are inflicted primarily on members of unorganized or politically
weak groups.
Because of the importance of injunctions in public law cases,
procedural, jurisdictional, and other related rules should be reformed to
reduce the unique obstacles that hinder plaintiffs in such cases from
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obtaining injunctive relief, and make injunctions available on a wider,
more consistent, and substantively defensible basis. Moreover, the
Cathedral framework should be modified as it applies to public law cases, to
more accurately reflect the important distinction between actually being
protected by an injunction (“complete property-rule” protection), and
merely having a substantial likelihood of being able to obtain one
(“potential property-rule” protection).
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INTRODUCTION
Commentators and courts generally maintain that, when a litigant
prevails in a public law case against a government agency or official, it
does not especially matter whether the court issues an injunction to
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accompany its judgment and opinion (except, perhaps, in the
institutional or structural reform context). 1 The Supreme Court has held
in public law cases that “there is little practical difference between
injunctive and declaratory relief.” 2 It has elaborated elsewhere that,
when a plaintiff successfully challenges a legal provision, “a district
court can generally protect . . . [the plaintiff’s] interests . . . by entering a
declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine
will be unnecessary.” 3
For example, in Roe v. Wade—perhaps one of the most hotly
contested Supreme Court decisions of all time 4—the Court held, “[w]e
find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in
withholding injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial
authorities will give full credence to this decision that the present
criminal abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional.” 5 Many

1 Lower courts have been more sympathetic to the need for injunctive relief in structural or
institutional reform cases, in which an entity such as a prison, hospital, or school district is being
operated in a pervasively unconstitutional manner. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66, 139
(D.D.C. 2003). Courts generally are more willing to grant injunctions in such cases because they often
impose prophylactic requirements or restrictions beyond those the accompanying opinion identifies
as constitutionally or legally necessary, or require the defendants to perform certain specified acts
from among a range of constitutionally and legally permissible alternatives. William A. Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635
(1982). Such broad relief can be necessary to remedy past constitutional or statutory violations; avoid
difficulties that arise from applying subjective standards, by giving the defendant concrete steps to
implement; make it easier for the court to monitor compliance; and address other problems that,
while not independently illegal or unconstitutional, exacerbate the effects of the legal or
constitutional violations. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 663–64 (1978). Owen Fiss has been a staunch proponent of injunctive
relief in structural reform cases. See generally OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
The Supreme Court has expressed concern over structural injunctive relief against government
entities, however, and is highly receptive to modifying or vacating such orders. See Horne v. Flores,
557 U.S. 433, 448–50 (2009). This Article focuses primarily on non-institutional public law cases, but
many of its insights apply to institutional cases as well.
2 California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982); see also Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943). This principle is not limited to public law cases; the
Court has held that the consequences of injunctive and declaratory relief are substantially equivalent
in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582,
591 (1995); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 131 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).
3 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712
(1977) (affirming grant of injunctive relief against police where “three successive prosecutions were
undertaken against [the plaintiff] in the span of five weeks” for covering the state motto on his license
plate).
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48–49 (1996).
5 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973); see also Republic Nat’l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 97 (1992)
(White, J., concurring) (explaining that declaratory relief is sufficient because government officials
can be “expect[ed]” to “satisfy their obligations”); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have long presumed that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the
law as declared by the court. As a result, [a] declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of an
injunction.”).
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academics, including Douglas Laycock, 6 Peter Schuck, 7 Michael L.
Wells, and Thomas A. Eaton, 8 likewise have minimized the importance
of injunctive relief in public law cases.
This presumptive indifference to whether a court’s judgment and
opinion are accompanied by an injunction is built into the framework
set forth by Judge Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their
seminal Article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral (the Cathedral framework). 9 Under the Cathedral
framework’s conception of a “property rule,” it does not matter whether
an entitlement is actually protected by an injunction. Commentators
applying the framework generally use the term “property rule” to refer
to two different groups of people: those who actually are protected by an
injunction against violations of a particular entitlement, and those who
merely have a substantial likelihood of obtaining such an injunction if
they go to court. 10 Most scholars who have applied the Cathedral
framework to public law have therefore concluded that constitutional
rights, except for those arising under the Takings Clause, 11 are per se
protected by property rules, regardless of whether a rightholder actually
is protected by an injunction. 12
6 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 497 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that injunctive
relief is largely superfluous in protecting public law rights, because declaratory judgments are just “as
effective”).
7 PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 191 (1983)
(arguing that “governmental liability for damages should enjoy remedial primacy,” and courts should
employ “[c]onditional declaratory relief” when such damages prove insufficient); see also Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (holding that the availability of compensatory damages from
government officials “serves [a] deterrent purpose”).
8 MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 185 (2002) (declaring that there is “little practical difference”
between injunctions and declaratory judgments). The remainder of the book does not distinguish
between these remedies. Id. at 186.
9 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For an explanation of the framework,
especially as applied to public law cases, see infra Part II.
10 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the
Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 610 (2001) (declaring that an entitlement is protected by a property
rule if the holder “can secure an injunction” against violations); Henry E. Smith, Property and
Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2004); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1996) (explaining the
concept of property rules without mentioning injunctions).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign
Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1135 n.325 (2001) (“[J]ust-compensation rights are uniquely weak;
they provide only liability-rule protection instead of the stronger property-rule protection provided
by other constitutional rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Christopher Serkin, Public
Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 884 (2011).
12 Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1695 (2007) (“In
Calabresi and Melamed’s terms, constitutional rights are protected by property rules . . . .”); Amnon
Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 2005 (2008) (discussing “property rules stemming
from broad-based constitutional provisions”); Seamon, supra note 11, at 1135 n.325; Serkin, supra
note 11, at 884; see, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First

MORLEY.35.6 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

8/1/2014 8:05 PM

PUBLIC LAW AT THE CATHEDRAL

2457

This Article rejects both the conventional view of injunctive relief
in public law cases, as well as prevailing attempts to apply the Cathedral
framework to them. It demonstrates that injunctions provide stronger
protection for a person’s constitutional or statutory rights than any
other remedy currently available from federal courts. 13 Moreover,
actually having the protection of an injunction should not be viewed as
effectively equivalent to merely having a substantial likelihood of being
able to obtain an injunction from court.
Normatively, this Article advocates that, at a minimum, plaintiffs
should not be required to overcome additional burdens or obstacles—
beyond those to which plaintiffs seeking injunctions typically are
subject—to obtain injunctive relief in public law cases, whether on
behalf of themselves or others similarly situated. Some courts, for
example, simply decline to issue injunctions in public law cases. 14
Others greatly limit the scope of such relief by refusing to certify classes
in public law cases under the judicially-created “necessity doctrine.”15
Because injunctions play such an important role in the enforcement of
statutory and constitutional rights against government officials and
entities, litigants seeking them should not be subject to these types of
additional hurdles.
Moreover, procedural rules and doctrines should be reformed to
eliminate contingent, random, or substantively unwarranted barriers to
the award of injunctions in public law cases. For example, a district
court may interpret a legal provision or adjudicate its validity in any of
the following contexts:
• an individual’s pre-enforcement suit, seeking injunctive relief
solely for the plaintiff;
• a pre-enforcement class action suit, seeking relief for both the
plaintiff and a class of similarly situated people; or
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 77 (1996) (“The First Amendment provides individuals with a
property right against the government’s interference with transmission of information: the
government does not have a right to stop you from speaking even it pays you for your lost
opportunity.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 115 & n.113 (1997); Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional
Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1914 (2007) (arguing that constitutional rights “should
generally be protected by more than mere ‘liability rules’”); Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas
Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 439 (2006) (“In the main,
constitutional law strongly disfavors the forced sale of individual rights, preferring specific
enforcement instead.”).
13 For brevity, this Article uses the term “right” broadly, rather than in a precise or technical
sense, as a shorthand way of referring to a person’s interest in having public officials act in
accordance with applicable legal restrictions. For example, this Article would contend that a person
has the “right” to not be subject to legislation that exceeds Congress’s Article I, § 8 powers, see, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), or a President who is less than thirty-five years old, cf.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
14 See, e.g., supra notes 2, 5.
15 See infra Part III.C.
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• a criminal prosecution in which the defendant challenges the
proper interpretation or validity of the underlying law or
regulation.

In each of these cases, the court may issue an opinion interpreting,
limiting, or invalidating the challenged legal provision on the same
grounds, for the same reasons. The legal consequences of the court’s
ruling and the type of protection it creates for the right at issue will
differ, however, based solely on the posture of the case. Procedural rules
allow plaintiffs in the first two types of cases to seek injunctive relief, but
not defendants in criminal prosecutions. Likewise, injunctive relief in
the individual suit would run only to the individual plaintiff and not
other, similarly situated people, while injunctive relief in the class action
would extend to all members of the class. Injunctive relief should not
hinge on such contingent aspects of cases. 16
This Article concludes by presenting a stronger variation of its
thesis, suggesting that a plaintiff who faces an impending constitutional
violation should be presumptively entitled to an injunction, as well as
the contempt remedies necessary to enforce it, and may be denied them
only in rare cases. The government generally may deprive a person of
her constitutional rights only to achieve a compelling interest that
cannot be furthered through more narrowly tailored means. 17 And an
injunction is the only legal mechanism through which a person may
attempt to prevent a violation of those rights ex ante. Procedural rules
or doctrines rooted primarily in judicial economy concerns should not
prevent a person from obtaining an injunction to protect her
constitutional rights when, as a matter of substantive law, the
government may not violate those rights, even to further much more
important goals.
Part I demonstrates that an injunction provides significantly more
protection for a person’s rights than either an entitlement to damages or
merely having a substantial likelihood of being able to obtain injunctive
relief (whether because of a declaratory judgment or a favorable judicial
opinion). This Part further shows that, when a person’s public law rights
are not protected by an injunction, agencies sometimes nonacquiesce to
judicial rulings with which they disagree and violate those rights,
particularly when: (i) high transaction costs may deter rightholders
from seeking judicial assistance (such as where administrative
16 Many procedural rules that restrict the availability of injunctions in public law cases apply
equally to declaratory relief. Thus, even if one disagrees with this Article’s descriptive premise about
the importance of injunctions against governmental agencies and officials, it is still possible to agree
with a modified version of the Article’s prescriptive argument, that injunctions (and, by extension,
declaratory judgments) should be made available in public law cases on a more consistent, uniform,
and substantively defensible basis.
17 E.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993).
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exhaustion requirements exist or the threatened violation is “fastmoving”); or (ii) the benefits of violating the right will accrue primarily
to a substantial number of politically active people and groups, while
violations are inflicted primarily on members of unorganized or
politically weak groups. This Part also responds to the claim that
property-rule protection is unnecessary for many constitutional rights.
Building on this analysis, Part II challenges the traditional
Cathedral conception of “property rule.” At least as applied to public
law cases, this concept should be disaggregated to distinguish between a
“complete property rule,” which applies if a person’s entitlement is
actually protected by an injunction, and a “potential property rule,”
which applies if a person instead has a substantial likelihood of
obtaining an injunction from a court. This modification provides a
useful vocabulary for discussing public law remedies, reflects the legal
significance of a court’s decision to issue an injunction (or its refusal or
inability to do so), and allows the Cathedral framework to be applied
more accurately to public law cases.
Part III recommends modifications to the procedural and related
doctrines that restrict the availability of injunctive relief in public law
cases based on contingent, random, or substantively indefensible
considerations. It examines: (i) rules that prohibit litigants from
bringing a claim or counterclaim for injunctive relief based on the
posture of a case; (ii) limitations on the entities against whom
injunctions may issue, stemming from sovereign immunity and Rule
65(d); 18 (iii) restrictions on class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against governmental defendants; 19
and (iv) the non-merits factors governing injunctive relief, including the
irreparable injury, inadequate remedy at law, balance-of-hardships, and
public interest requirements. 20 A brief conclusion follows. Whereas
Calabresi and Melamed illuminated the Cathedral’s common law nave,
this Article attempts to cast a new light on its constitutional and
statutory presbyter.
I. COMPARING REMEDIES IN PUBLIC LAW CASES
Despite conventional wisdom to the contrary, a court’s decision
about whether to issue an injunction in a public law case is significant; it
substantially affects both the way in which the rights of the successful
litigant (and others) are protected and the likelihood that the
government will respect those rights.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
20 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
18
19
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Most scholars and courts downplay the significance of injunctions
in public law cases for three main reasons. First, many courts
optimistically assume that government officials view adherence to
judicial opinions as part of their duty. 21 Second, the threat of having to
pay compensatory damages under § 1983 22 or Bivens 23—as well as the
possibility of punitive damages 24 or criminal prosecution 25 for civil
rights violations—often are regarded as sufficient to deter government
officials from violating public law rights recognized in judicial opinions
or declaratory judgments. 26
Third, a person facing an impending violation of a constitutional
or statutory right recognized in an opinion or declaratory judgment
likely can obtain emergency relief in time to prevent the threatened
violation from occurring. That ability to obtain a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction leads executive officials to refrain from
attempting to violate the right in the first place. In other words, a
substantial likelihood of being able to obtain an injunction is effectively
equivalent to actually having one. 27
This Part considers and responds to these arguments,
demonstrating that a person’s public-law rights are most firmly
protected when the rightholder is covered by an injunction, compared
to other remedies that federal courts offer. Section A lays the foundation
for this discussion by contrasting the legal effects of judgments,
See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
23 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
24 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269–70 (1981).
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 242. A government official generally may not be prosecuted under § 242 unless
the victim’s constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time the official allegedly violated it;
the tests for civil and criminal liability are largely equivalent. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
270–71 (1997).
26 See, e.g., Memphis Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (“Section 1983
presupposes that damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional
violations.”); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980); SCHUCK, supra note 7, at 191.
This rationale does not apply to district court opinions in circuits that ignore district court rulings,
and consider only circuit court and Supreme Court opinions, in determining whether the law on an
issue is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes. See, e.g., Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268
F.3d 1014, 1032–33, 1033 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th
Cir. 1995) (“[D]istrict court decisions cannot clearly establish a constitutional right.”); Richardson v.
Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1993) (same). The Supreme Court has approved of this approach
without resolving the inverse issue of whether a circuit may choose to allow district court rulings to
clearly establish law and allow plaintiffs to overcome public officials’ qualified immunity. Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011).
27 See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 497; WELLS & EATON, supra note 8, at 185; cf. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19 (noting that
parties to a dispute “each predict what the court will do. If the predictions agree, they can settle at
once. If the predictions do not agree, they still may settle if the value of the divergence is less than the
cost both sides will incur in obtaining the court’s answer . . . .”); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)
(explaining how litigants negotiate and act based on the expected outcome of litigation).
21
22
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injunctions, and written judicial opinions. The remaining Subsections
proceed by induction, examining and rejecting each of the typical
justifications for minimizing the significance of injunctive relief in
public law cases. Building on the work of Daryl Levinson, 28 Section B
shows that alternate forms of relief, such as compensatory and punitive
damages, are insufficient to protect public law rights, because public
officials are not deterred by the prospect of monetary damages in the
same way as private actors. This discussion also responds to the position
advanced by several scholars that certain constitutional rights should be
protected exclusively through ex post awards of compensatory damages.
Section C examines the weaknesses of the “shadow of the law”-type
argument that merely having a substantial likelihood of being able to
obtain an injunction is effective interchangeable with actually having
one. 29 Section D offers a qualitative empirical analysis of agency
nonacquiescence in judicial rulings to demonstrate that, when a court
does not issue an injunction in a public law case, public officials who
disagree with the court’s ruling cannot necessarily be expected to simply
follow it. 30
Thus, a court’s decision to award an injunction in a public law case
carries both legal and practical significance that most discussions of
public law remedies overlook or minimize. An injunction is likely to
make the biggest difference in cases where the government disagrees
with the court’s ruling and: (i) rightholders encounter substantial
barriers to seeking injunctive relief, such as when they face timeconsuming administrative exhaustion requirements or “fast-moving”
violations of their entitlements; or (ii) the benefits of violating the right
will accrue primarily to a substantial number of politically influential
people or groups, while violations are inflicted primarily on members of
unorganized or politically weak groups.
A.

Components of a Public Law Ruling

When a court interprets a legal provision or holds it
unconstitutional, the court’s ruling may be comprised of up to three
different components: the judgment31 (as modified by any appellate
mandate); 32 the accompanying injunction or order, if any; and the
written opinion, if any. Each of these components has different legal
28 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
29 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30 Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 58.
32 FED. R. APP. P. 41.
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effects and impacts executive officials in different ways. The
consequences of a judicial ruling interpreting a legal provision or
holding it unconstitutional, as well as the nature of the protection that a
person’s rights receive as a result of that ruling, depend on which of
these components the court employs.
1.

Judgment

A judgment is an independent, self-contained document through
which a court terminates a case. 33 It identifies the prevailing parties and
the relief each is awarded, but does not include the court’s reasoning or
intermediate holdings; 34 it is distinct from any findings of fact or written
opinion the court might render. 35 In a suit for damages, the judgment
may direct payment from certain litigants to others. When a party seeks
injunctive relief, the judgment may contain, allude to, or reproduce the
injunction. In a declaratory judgment action, the judgment may contain
the requested declarations of law. 36
A judgment, however, does not bind anyone other than the parties
to the underlying case. 37 Moreover, although courts have the inherent
authority to enforce their judgments, 38 neither judgments in general,
nor declaratory judgments in particular, are enforceable through
contempt. 39 If a government litigant acts contrary to a declaratory
judgment, the rightholder may seek additional relief, including an
injunction against future violations, 40 but that government litigant
would not be subject to any immediate sanctions.

FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a).
12 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 58.05[1], [4][a] (3d ed. 2013).
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1); see also R.R. Vill. Ass’n, Inc. v. Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197,
1201 (2d Cir. 1987).
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(A) (2012); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 57.
37 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application in AngloAmerican jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he
is not designated as a party . . . .”). A lawsuit also may bind certain third parties, such as the litigants’
privies, under certain narrow circumstances. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 & 894 n.8
(2008).
38 See Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (“Further necessary
or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice
and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.”).
39 “[A] declaratory judgment . . . is a much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it
may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is
not contempt.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
125–26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see, e.g., Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
40 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 499 (1969).
33
34
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Injunction

An injunction is a court order that may direct government agencies
or officials to act, or refrain from acting, in certain ways. Unlike a
judgment, an injunction applies not only to the litigants in a case, but
their officers and agents, as well as anyone else acting “in active concert
or participation” with them. 41 It may impose restrictions or
requirements that go beyond what the accompanying judgment or
opinion identify as constitutionally or legally required, to “fit[] the
remedy to the wrong or injury that has been established.” 42
An injunction is the only mechanism that gives a person the
immediate ability to attempt to prevent violations of a constitutional or
statutory right ex ante. A court may threaten or hold violators in civil
contempt to attempt to prevent violations before they occur or end
violations that otherwise would persist. 43 It may set the fine for civil
contempt at whatever amount it deems necessary to coerce the
defendant’s compliance, even if it far exceeds the amount of damages
the rightholder could obtain as compensation ex post. 44 In Spallone v.
United States, for example, the Supreme Court refused to stay civil
contempt fines of $1 million per day against a city whose council
refused to follow the district court’s order to pass an ordinance allowing
the construction of public housing. 45
If a defendant violates an injunction, the court may award
compensatory damages ex post to the rightholder. 46 It also may hold
violators in criminal contempt47 and impose punitive fines or
imprisonment. 48 The court even may appoint a prosecutor, who may be
an attorney outside the government, if necessary, to pursue criminal
contempt prosecutions of those who violate its orders. 49
3.

Written Opinion

Finally, when granting relief in statutory and constitutional cases,
courts typically issue written opinions through which they justify the
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(B)–(C).
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 718 (2010). But see Michael T. Morley, Statutory Injunctions,
2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming) (arguing that, when a federal law provides for injunctive relief,
courts should decline to impose prophylactic restrictions that bar conduct which the statute itself
does not prohibit).
43 Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994).
44 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947).
45 Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251 (1988).
46 United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304.
47 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987).
48 See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828–29.
49 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2).
41
42

MORLEY.35.6 (Do Not Delete)

2464

8/1/2014 8:05 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2453

exercise of their Article III power “to say what the law is.” 50 A judicial
opinion does not bind government defendants in the same manner, or
through the same mechanisms, as judgments and injunctions. 51 An
opinion from an appellate court primarily offers insight into how the
same court will address related issues in the future due to stare decisis52
or the prior panel rule, 53 and how lower courts will do so based on their
obligation to follow higher courts’ precedents as part of a hierarchical
judicial system. 54 An appellate opinion also may “clearly establish” the
law on an issue, allowing plaintiffs to overcome government officials’
qualified immunity 55 and obtain ex post damages under § 1983 56 or
Bivens. 57 In rare cases, the government may decide to criminally
prosecute a public official who violates a constitutional right recognized
by a judicial opinion. 58
District court opinions, in contrast, have far less effect, even aside
from their much more limited geographic reach. Most notably, they do

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993).
52 State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
53 Under this rule, which applies to federal circuit courts of appeal, “a prior panel’s holding is
binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of
abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v. Mitchell, 500 F.
App’x 802, 803 (11th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d
1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“It is this Court’s responsibility
to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect
that understanding of the governing rule of law.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing “one
supreme Court” and recognizing Congress’s ability to create “inferior Courts”).
55 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500–01, 506–08
(1978).
56 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
57 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). A
plaintiff may pursue compensatory damages against a municipality or county even if the law was not
clearly established at the time of the alleged statutory or constitutional violation. Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). Such local government units may be held liable, however,
only under certain narrow circumstances that often are challenging to establish. Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–83 (1986); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
In contrast, a plaintiff generally may not seek damages for constitutional or statutory violations
directly against the federal government, a state, or a federal or state agency. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994) (refusing to recognize Bivens remedy against federal entities); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781 (1978) (holding that sovereign immunity presumptively prevents private
plaintiffs from suing states in federal court); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
64 (1989) (holding that states are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983). A plaintiff may sue the
government or a state for damages only if, among other things, the government or state has waived its
sovereign immunity against the type of claim the plaintiff wishes to pursue, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(waiving sovereign immunity against certain types of tort claims against the government), or
Congress has abrogated States’ sovereign immunity against that type of claim, see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976).
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
50
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not give rise to stare decisis: 59 “‘A decision of a federal district court
judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the
same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.’” 60
Similarly, in many circuits, a district court opinion is insufficient to
“clearly establish” the law on an issue and allow a plaintiff to overcome a
government official’s qualified immunity. 61
Because government entities generally are not subject to offensive
collateral estoppel, 62 opinions at any level below the Supreme Court do
not preclude future litigation in other jurisdictions on the meaning of a
constitutional or statutory provision. Also, judicial opinions are not
directly enforceable through civil or criminal contempt. A person must
obtain an injunction to attempt to prevent a government agency or
official from acting inconsistently with an opinion.
B.

Alternative Remedies Are Insufficient

Despite the fact that having an injunction changes the range of
remedies that a rightholder may immediately invoke to attempt to
prevent statutory and constitutional violations, courts and
commentators typically downplay the significance of injunctive relief in
public law cases for a variety of reasons. One such theory is that the
prospect of damages against either governmental entities or individual
government officials is sufficient to deter them from violating people’s
rights. 63
Subsection 1 demonstrates that the prospect of liability for
compensatory damages is insufficient to prevent government actors
from violating statutory or constitutional rights ex ante. Subsection 2
shows that the additional threat of punitive damages or criminal
prosecution for such violations offers limited protection, at best. Finally,
Subsection 3 responds to the argument that, at least under certain
circumstances, some constitutional rights should be protected
exclusively by a liability rule, meaning that rightholders should not be
permitted to seek injunctions to prevent or end violations of those
rights.

59 “[A] district court cannot be said to be bound by a decision of one of its brother or sister
judges.” Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., 240 F.3d 956, 965 (11th Cir.
2011).
60 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 34, § 134.02[1][d]).
61 See supra note 26.
62 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
63 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Compensatory Damages

The possibility of being held liable for compensatory damages ex
post is generally unlikely to deter a government official or entity from
violating constitutional or statutory rights, for several reasons. First, in
many constitutional cases, particularly those that do not involve
physical assaults or deprivations of personal property, the amount of
damages that a plaintiff may recover is quite limited. “[D]amages based
on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a
permissible element of compensatory damages . . . .” 64
In Carey v. Piphus, for example, a school district had suspended a
student without first giving him a chance to be heard. 65 The Supreme
Court held that, although the school had violated the student’s due
process rights, he could not recover more than one dollar in nominal
damages. 66 The Court explained that the student had not suffered any
cognizable harm from the due process violation, since his suspension
was substantively warranted and would have been imposed even had the
school followed constitutionally adequate procedures. 67 Many types of
constitutional violations likewise involve harm that is largely
incommensurable, symbolic, or, at the very least, noneconomic. Thus,
the threat of an ex post compensatory damages award—especially when
reduced by the likelihood of a rightholder actually filing a lawsuit and
litigating until a favorable outcome or settlement is reached—often is
unlikely to be a substantial deterrent to many constitutional violations.
Second, as Professor Daryl Levinson convincingly demonstrates,
government officials and agencies are not motivated by economic
incentives in the same way as private actors. 68 Levinson explains that
front-line government officials typically respond to their bureaucracies’
incentive structures, including the standards for receiving positive
evaluations, promotions, bonuses, and indemnification from damage
awards. Policymakers, in turn, generally structure agencies’ policies and
incentive systems to ensure the satisfaction of a majority of the public
(or the satisfaction of a sufficiently large coalition of interest groups), in
order to receive continued political support. 69
Levinson explains that, even if officials or municipalities are held
liable for constitutional (or, by extension, statutory) violations,
policymakers nevertheless may have an incentive to not only permit
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986).
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 250 (1978).
66 Id. at 266–67.
67 Id.
68 See Levinson, supra note 28, at 416 (“[M]aking government pay money is not an especially
promising approach to constitutional remedies . . . .”).
69 Id. at 352–53.
64
65
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such conduct, but structure agencies’ internal incentive systems to
encourage it: 70
So long as the social benefits of constitutional violations exceed the
compensable costs to the victim and are enjoyed by a majority of the
population, compensation will never deter a majoritarian
government from violating constitutional rights, because the
majority of citizens will gain more from the benefits of government
activity than they lose from the taxes necessary to finance
compensation payments to victims. 71

He offers the example of warrantless, suspicionless stop-and-frisks
of young men loitering in high-crime areas: “Even if every victim” of
such stop-and-frisks “were entitled to compensation, the majority of
citizens would be happy to pay this price for the (by hypothesis) greater
benefits of decreased crime.” 72 Pamela Karlan 73 makes the same point,
focusing on the chokeholds of criminal suspects challenged in City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons. 74 Because the Supreme Court relegated potential
chokehold victims to ex post suits for damages, “the city could go on
choke holding individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment as
long as it was willing to pay damages at the back end—damages that
were . . . unlikely to fully deter unconstitutional conduct, precisely
because the city’s policy was politically popular.” 75 Thus, when a
sufficiently large proportion of voters or coalition of interest groups
believes that the benefits of violating a particular constitutional
entitlement outweigh the monetary cost of compensating rightholders,
the prospect of such compensation will not deter politicians from
allowing or encouraging agencies to engage in such conduct.
Third, most of the time, government officials—particularly law
enforcement officers, who are most susceptible to constitutional
claims76—are indemnified against compensatory damage awards in
constitutional and statutory cases arising from their work. 77 New York
Id. at 352.
Id. at 370. Later in his Article, Levinson applies a similar analysis based on an interest group,
rather than majoritarian, model. Id. at 378–79.
72 Id. at 368.
73 Karlan, supra note 12, at 1917.
74 461 U.S. 95 (1985).
75 Karlan, supra note 12, at 1917; see also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and
the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 782 (2004).
76 Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police
Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587,
587–88 (2000); Nicole G. Tell, Note, Representing Police Officers and Municipalities: A Conflict of
Interest for a Municipal Attorney in a § 1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2836–
37 (1997).
77 Miller & Wright, supra note 75, at 781; Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed That
Municipality Will Indemnify Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1209, 1217 (2001).
70
71
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City, for example, “regularly indemnifies police officers regardless of
whether they acted intentionally, recklessly, or brutally; whether or not
they violated federal or state law; or whether or not they violated the
rules and regulations of the New York City Police Department . . . .”78
Pressure from public employee unions makes such policies difficult to
change. This coverage necessarily dampens whatever deterrent effect the
prospect of compensatory damage awards may have on government
officials.
Similarly, many agencies are not required to pay large damage
awards out of their own budgets; rather, such judgments typically are
paid from the general fund of the municipality, state, or federal
government. 79 This further reduces the deterrent effect of such awards
on government agencies.
Fourth, damages are unlikely to be an effective deterrent where a
constitutional or statutory right is recognized or established exclusively
in district court opinions. Qualified immunity protects public
employees and officials from being held personally liable for violating a
plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights unless, at the time of their
actions, those rights were “clearly established.” 80 Generally, for a right to
be deemed clearly established, a court must have recognized or upheld
the right under closely related factual circumstances. 81
Many circuits do not allow district court rulings to be considered
in determining whether a right was clearly established at the time of an
official’s challenged conduct. 82 Consequently, public officials in those
jurisdictions typically may not be held liable for violating rights that are
recognized only in district court opinions. And by declining to appeal
adverse district court rulings, government litigants can prevent higher
courts from ruling on an issue, thereby preventing the law from
becoming clearly established for qualified immunity purposes.
Sovereign immunity prevents plaintiffs from circumventing
qualified immunity by suing the federal government or a state directly 83
and, in any event, states are not subject to suit under § 1983. 84 Although
plaintiffs may sue municipalities for public law violations without
demonstrating that their rights were clearly established, 85 such suits are
permissible only under certain narrow circumstances, may not be based

Emery & Maazel, supra note 76, at 587–88.
Miller & Wright, supra note 75, at 781. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2012) (establishing
federal judgment fund).
80 See supra note 55.
81 See id.
82 See supra note 26.
83 See supra note 57.
84 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1989).
85 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 n.33 (1980); see also id. at 650–51.
78
79
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on respondeat superior liability, and are rarely successful. 86 For these
reasons, it can be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to seek damages for
violations of constitutional or statutory rights that are recognized or
established only in district court opinions, and strategic government
litigants can prevent higher courts from having the opportunity to
affirm such rights.
Finally, damages are inherently an ex post remedy. A rightholder
may use the threat of damages, of course, to attempt to deter a
government actor from violating her rights. The right to obtain damages
after a violation has occurred, however, does not give the rightholder a
formal legal mechanism for preventing the violation from occurring in
the first place. At most, damages are a second-best alternative to more
direct forms of preventative relief.
Thus, compensatory damages are unlikely to prevent many types of
constitutional and statutory violations, particularly when the violations
are politically popular. They also will be an ineffective deterrent where
violations do not result in tangible harm, violators are indemnified
against paying damages, or the rights at issue are recognized only in
district court opinions. 87
2.

Punitive Damages and Criminal Prosecutions

Punitive damages are potentially more effective than compensatory
damages alone at deterring government actors from violating public law
rights, because they increase the potential ex post consequences of such
violations. 88 As a practical matter, however, they are unlikely to exert a
substantial deterrent effect for many of the reasons discussed in the
preceding subsection. Most basically, the Due Process Clause generally
requires the size of a punitive damage award to be related to the amount
of compensatory damages a plaintiff receives. 89 Although the Court has
upheld larger punitive awards in cases where “a particularly egregious
86 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 463
(2002) (“[The] standards of municipal liability make it exceedingly difficult to prove that local
governments are causally responsible, and thus directly liable, for wrongs committed by their
officials.”); Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1449, 1462 (2009).
87 Cf. Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability
Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 76 (2010) (arguing that liability
rules do not provide sufficient protection for states’ Tenth Amendment rights against federal
commandeering of their personnel).
88 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (affirming that punitive damages are available in
§ 1983 suits); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (noting the availability of punitive damages
against federal officials and employees in Bivens suits).
89 BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582–83 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003).
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act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages,” 90
punitive damage awards in public law cases remain subject to strong
constitutional constraints.
Moreover, even when punitive damages increase the amount
government entities must pay (whether directly or indirectly, through
indemnification) after violating a public law right, those entities still face
the same underlying calculus described by Levinson and Karlan.
Government officials have an incentive to violate a right when the
perceived benefit to a sufficiently large plurality of politically active
citizens or coalition of interest groups outweighs the expected amount
of a damage award. 91
Additionally, numerous jurisdictions indemnify government
officials and employees against punitive damage awards. 92 Even when
they are not indemnified as of right, municipal entities often voluntarily
choose to indemnify employees against punitive damages 93 or engage in
other machinations to assume the liability. 94
Furthermore, the range of public law cases in which punitive
damages are available is quite limited. As discussed earlier, a plaintiff
may not obtain any relief, including punitive damages, against a public
official for violating a right that is established or recognized only in
district court opinions in circuits where such rulings cannot “clearly
establish” the law on an issue. 95 A plaintiff able to overcome qualified
immunity must further demonstrate that the defendant showed
“reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights” or intentionally
violated the law to qualify for punitive damages. 96 Even where a plaintiff
satisfies these requirements, the jury has discretion over whether to
award punitive damages; a plaintiff is not entitled to them. 97 And such

Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
Karlan, supra note 12, at 1917; Levinson, supra note 28, at 352–53, 370, 388–89.
92 Schwartz, supra note 77, at 1219 & n.49; Tell, supra note 76, at 2836 & n.80.
93 James D. Cole, Defense and Indemnification of Local Officials: Constitutional and Other
Concerns, 58 ALB. L. REV. 789, 807–08 (1995); Tell, supra note 76, at 2836 & n.81; see, e.g., O’Neill v.
Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1988). Martin Schwartz offers a variety of reasons why
municipalities may choose to indemnify public officials against punitive damages. Schwartz, supra
note 77, at 1221.
94 For example, state law prohibits municipalities in Illinois from indemnifying police officers for
punitive damage awards. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-302 (2014). When a jury enters such an award
against a Chicago police officer, however, the City of Chicago often will negotiate a post-verdict
settlement under which it agrees to pay an undifferentiated sum to the plaintiff, sufficient to cover the
amount of both compensatory and punitive damages the plaintiff was awarded, thereby “insulating
errant officers from accountability.” Mark Iris, Illegal Searches in Chicago: The Outcomes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Litigation, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 123, 134 (2012).
95 See supra note 26.
96 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).
97 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
90
91
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damages may never be awarded in connection with a § 1983 claim
against a county or municipal government. 98
Finally, while punitive damages are a greater deterrent than
compensatory damages alone, they remain an ex post remedy. The
ability to seek punitive damages after a public law violation has occurred
does not give a plaintiff a formal legal mechanism, beyond the mere
threat of ex post litigation, for preventing the violation ex ante.
The possibility of criminal prosecution for violations of public law
rights 99 generally is even more remote, and is a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, outside the rightholder’s control. Such prosecutions are
relatively rare, particularly in the absence of serious physical violence or
intentional racial discrimination. 100 Law enforcement agents may be
reluctant to investigate or prosecute either members of their own agency
or other government officials who violate the Constitution or statutes in
the course of pursuing legitimate government goals. Because
prosecutions for civil rights violations are possible only where the
underlying right is “clearly established,” 101 rightholders also face some of
the same obstacles that qualified immunity imposes in suits for
damages. Thus, while criminal prosecution is a fallback remedy for
especially egregious violations, it is unlikely to have a major deterrent
effect in most cases.
3.

Against Exclusive Constitutional Liability Rules

Some commentators—who may be called Constitutional Liability
Rule Scholars—have argued that, at least under some circumstances,
certain constitutional rights should be protected exclusively by liability
rules. 102 Under this view, a court may not enjoin the government ex ante
See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 (2012).
100 Frederick Schauer, When and How (If At All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 44 GA. L.
REV. 769, 787–88 (2010).
101 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270–71 (1997).
102 Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56
STAN. L. REV. 755, 759, 765 (2004) (stating that constitutional entitlements should be protected by
liability rules “where high transaction costs prevent efficient rights-transfers under a property rule”);
Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of
Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1138–39 (2005) (applying the author’s earlier work to a
broader range of rights); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting,
Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1156–58 (1999)
(identifying a range of factors that should determine whether constitutional rights are protected by
liability or property rules); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of
Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 1009 (1998) (arguing that, in “hard cases,” courts
should have discretion to “recognize a constitutional violation and yet, when the social costs of relief
seem overwhelming, refuse to enjoin it”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action:
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2,
27 (2008) (discussing the possibility of protecting some constitutional rights through liability rules);
98
99

MORLEY.35.6 (Do Not Delete)

2472

8/1/2014 8:05 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2453

from violating those rights; instead, it may only order ex post
compensation for the rightholder.
The Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars contend that social
welfare sometimes would be maximized by allowing the government to
act in ways that violate constitutional rights. Currently, in such cases,
the government often attempts to induce the rightholder to voluntarily
waive her rights, either unilaterally or in exchange for some benefit (as
with a plea bargain). 103 These authors argue that, when high transaction
costs prevent the government from obtaining such waivers through
voluntary negotiations, it should be permitted to simply violate the
rights and compensate the rightholder(s) afterwards. 104 High transaction
costs may exist where the government either needs a particular person
to waive his right, effectively making him a monopolist, or instead
requires waivers from numerous people to achieve its goal, thereby
giving rise to holdout and adverse selection problems. 105 In effect,
Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars advocate treating certain
constitutional rights the way that the Takings Clause treats the right to
property—as subject to “condemnation” by the government upon
payment of just compensation, to promote efficiency. 106
Eugene Kontorovich argues that allowing rights to be protected
only by liability rules under certain circumstances also offers courts a
Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show that the
Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 53, 96–97 (2006) (discussing the possibility of protecting juveniles’ due process rights through
liability rules); Kenneth Baker, Note, Affirmative Action at the Cathedral: Applying Liability Rules to
Benign Discrimination in Educational Admissions, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 446–47 (2011)
(applying Kontorovich’s theory to affirmative action programs and the Equal Protection Clause); cf.
Ryan, supra note 87, at 11 (arguing that states’ rights under the Constitution should be protected by
property rules instead of inalienability rules, so that states can waive them).
More specifically, Kontorovich advocates that constitutional rights be protected by a “pliability
rule,” under which the entitlement is protected by a property rule under some circumstances, and by
a liability rule the rest of the time. Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of
Mass Detentions, supra, at 760–61; Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction
Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, supra, at 1140 (explaining how the Third Amendment
establishes an express pliability rule); see also Baker, supra, at 445–47. See generally Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2002) (explaining the concept of
“pliability rules”).
103 Merrill, supra note 102, at 1158–59.
104 Id. at 1159–60; Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass
Detentions, supra note 102, at 759, 765; Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A
Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1153–54; accord Baker, supra
note 102, at 447; cf. Bhagwat, supra note 102, at 962–63, 967 (arguing that courts should exercise their
remedial discretion to decline to award injunctive relief in “hard” cases, in which the results are “not
dictated, or even closely guided, by existing legal materials (including precedents) and/or
interpretational theories”).
105 Merrill, supra note 102, at 1159; Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A
Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1153–54.
106 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 779; see also id. at 759, 792; Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction
Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1189.
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compromise alternative that, in practice, will lead them to recognize a
greater range of constitutional rights. 107 He invokes Daryl Levinson’s
theory of remedial equilibration, which teaches that a “right may be
shaped by the nature of the remedy that will follow if the right is
violated.” 108 Applying that theory, Kontorovich explains that allowing a
court to protect certain constitutional rights through liability rules
enables it to affirm a right’s existence while avoiding the negative social
consequences that would result from prohibiting the government from
engaging in the challenged behavior. 109 Thus, offering courts greater
flexibility with regard to constitutional remedies may make them more
willing to recognize constitutional rights. 110 Thomas Merrill adds that
imposing a compensation requirement ensures that the government will
“condemn” a person’s rights “only if the social benefits of extinguishing
the right exceed the private value of the right” to the rightholder. 111
Commentators have suggested a range of rights that they contend
should be protected exclusively through liability rules, at least under
certain circumstances. Most notably, Kontorovich advocates that the
Fifth Amendment right to Due Process should be protected only by a
liability rule when the government detains large groups of people based
on their “ethnic or ideological characteristics” in the wake of a mass
107 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 757, 760, 798.
108 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884
(1999).
109 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 757, 759, 761, 802, 805–06.
110 Kontorovich further contends that switching from a property-rule to a liability-rule regime
would ensure that rightholders “enjoy some financial recovery” for violations of their rights. Id. at
760. As explained infra Part II, however, constitutional rights may enjoy both liability-rule and
property-rule protection simultaneously. The need to compensate rightholders for violations should
not prevent a court from attempting to prevent the government from violating their rights in the first
instance.
111 Merrill, supra note 102, at 1201. This argument, of course, runs contrary to Daryl Levinson’s
theory that government actors neither internalize, nor are motivated by, financial costs in the same
manner as private actors. See Levinson, supra note 28.
One interesting distinction between Merrill’s and Kontorovich’s approaches is that Merrill
urges that liability rules be used only where there is an “objective basis for calculating ex post
compensation.” Merrill, supra note 102, at 1163. Unless juries can ascertain the damages that result
from a rights violation with some decree of precision, he contends, “the magnitude of verdicts would
vary tremendously” and compensatory damages “would operate more like an open-ended regime of
punitive damages.” Id. at 1165.
Kontorovich agrees that constitutional rights “do not lend themselves to objective measures of
compensation,” and believes that measurement difficulties are likely to cause courts and juries to
systematically undervalue rights. Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of
Mass Detentions, supra note 102, at 773. He does not believe that such difficulties counsel against the
imposition of liability rules, however, because the value of constitutional rights “should be no harder
or easier to quantify than such imponderables as emotional distress, which courts routinely
monetize.” Id. at 774. Kontorovich argues that courts could help offset valuation difficulties by
compensating for the “intangible” aspects of constitutional violations. Id.; cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 256–57 (1978).

MORLEY.35.6 (Do Not Delete)

2474

8/1/2014 8:05 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2453

attack. 112 He explains that courts historically have been unwilling to
hold mass detentions by the executive unconstitutional 113 and have
instead “denied the existence of the constitutional right or . . . avoided
decision.”114 A liability rule, Kontorovich argues, would allow a court to
hold such detentions and racial profiling unconstitutional, while
allowing the government to continue performing them, by awarding the
victims monetary compensation instead of an injunction. 115
Merrill similarly argues that the First Amendment right of tobacco
companies to advertise cigarettes should be protected only by a liability
rule. He explains that the government should restrict cigarette
advertising because, although it has some private value for cigarette
companies by helping them generate additional profits, 116 it has little
public value 117 and leads to substantial social costs by encouraging youth
smoking. 118 Merrill contends that liability-rule protection is appropriate
because restrictions on cigarette advertising would be ineffective unless
they applied to all tobacco companies, leading to holdout problems in
negotiating voluntary waivers under a property-rule regime. 119 Other
authors have recommended protecting other rights exclusively through
liability rules, including juveniles’ due process rights 120 and the equal
protection right against certain kinds of racial preferences. 121
The Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars’ approach to protecting
constitutional rights is creative and intriguing, but ultimately flawed.
Neither the text of the Constitution nor the intent of the Framers
suggests that the government may violate the Constitution, so long as it
compensates adversely affected individuals afterwards. The
Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars’ theory is based on questionable
112 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 757; see also id. at 760, 790. According to Kontorovich, lack of time and information, holdout
problems, and adverse selection prevent the government from asking members of an ethnic, religious,
or ideological group that is purportedly associated with an attack to voluntarily waive their due
process rights. Id. at 788–89.
113 Id. at 760, 781.
114 Id. at 760.
115 Id. at 760. Kontorovich’s follow-up Article applies this theory to other constitutional contexts,
as well. Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of
Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1143.
116 Merrill, supra note 102, at 1191–92.
117 Id. at 1182–84.
118 Id. at 1188–89, 1191.
119 Id. at 1200. He explains that, if even a single cigarette company runs advertisements that are
attractive to youths, teenagers who decide to start smoking would flock to that brand, and other
cigarette companies would implement comparable advertising to offset that advantage. Id.
120 Moin A. Yahya argues that states should be permitted to immediately impose “hard labor,
caning, or some other harsh punishment” on juveniles suspected of serious crimes, so that “the
message that youth violence will not be tolerated would be loud and clear.” Yahya, supra note 102, at
96–97. Juveniles who are later acquitted would receive “compensation . . . for having been wrongly
punished.” Id.
121 Baker, supra note 102, at 440–41.

MORLEY.35.6 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

PUBLIC LAW AT THE CATHEDRAL

8/1/2014 8:05 PM

2475

notions of “rights” and “incommensurability.” Additionally, despite
those theorists’ insistence to the contrary, their approach can have
profound implications for structural constitutional provisions, as well.
a. Constitutional Text
Most basically, the Constitution’s text does not suggest that the
government may violate people’s rights, so long as it pays
compensation. Rather, both the Article I Bill of Rights 122 as well as the
first ten amendments are written in imperative or prohibitory terms:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”; 123
“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed”; 124 “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” 125 These clauses do not suggest that the Constitution
empowers the government to engage in the prohibited acts, so long as it
compensates the rightholder.
Kontorovich summarily dismisses this argument, cautioning that
one should not read too much into the “tone” of the Constitution’s
rights-related clauses. 126 This argument is not based on the “tone” of
these provisions, however, but rather their ordinary meaning; they
expressly declare that the government lacks power to engage in certain
acts. 127 This conclusion is only reinforced by the Takings Clause, which
provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” 128 This clause expressly permits the government to
take a person’s property without her consent so long as it compensates
her. 129 The expressio unius canon suggests that the absence of
comparable language from other constitutional provisions means that
they do not share this structure. 130
Kontorovich draws the opposite conclusion from the Takings
Clause. He reasons that, because it “is the only provision in the
Constitution that explicitly prescribes a remedy of any kind for its
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Id. amend. I.
124 Id. amend. II.
125 Id. amend. IV.
126 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 814; see also id. at 778 (arguing that the framers “gave the legislature almost entirely unguided
discretion to craft remedies for the rights set out in the Constitution”); Kontorovich, The Constitution
in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1171
(“[I]t is far from clear that the use of ‘shall’ and ‘shall not’ is a textual prohibition on liability
rules . . . .”).
127 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“[P]owers not delegated to the [federal government] . . . are
reserved to the States . . . or to the people.”).
128 Id. amend. V.
129 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
130 Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993).
122
123
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violation,” most other constitutional provisions “leave[] remedies open
to legislative experimentation.” 131 He goes on to claim that any other
application of expressio unius reasoning to the Takings Clause “would
lead to the conclusion that the Constitution offers no remedy at all for
violations of other rights.” 132
Kontorovich’s argument seems to be based on mistaken notions of
the precise right that the Takings Clause protects and what constitutes a
“violation[]” of that provision. 133 The Takings Clause does not prohibit
the government from taking private property and establish liability-rule
protection for violations of that right, as Kontorovich appears to
contend. Rather, as mentioned earlier, the Clause expressly authorizes
the government to take private property so long as it pays just
compensation. 134 In other words, when a compensated taking occurs,
the clause has not been violated. The Supreme Court has explained that
the Takings Clause
does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a
condition on the exercise of that power. . . . [I]t is designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking. 135

No other constitutional provision similarly permits the government to
engage in an otherwise proscribed act so long as it pays the adversely
affected rightholder afterwards.
Likewise, the Takings Clause’s just compensation provision does
not implicitly prohibit courts from awarding damages ex post for
violations of other constitutional provisions. 136 Compensation is not a
remedy for Takings Clause violations, but rather an element that
prevents the government’s seizure of a person’s property from
amounting to a constitutional violation in the first place. 137 Therefore,
while the Takings Clause’s just compensation language implicitly
supports the ex ante award of injunctions to prevent violations of other
constitutional provisions, it does not preclude the use of compensatory
131 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 814–15.
132 Id. at 816.
133 Id.
134 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
135 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314–15
(1987); see also Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)
(“The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just
compensation.”).
136 Cf. Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra
note 102, at 816.
137 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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damages as an ex post remedy when the government violates such other
provisions. 138
b. Framers’ Intent
This textual reading is buttressed by even a cursory examination of
the Framers’ intent in enacting the Bill of Rights. For example, when
James Madison proposed the initial draft of the Bill of Rights to the
House of Representatives, he declared: “[T]he great object in view is to
limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the
grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or
to act only in a particular mode.” 139 The amendments were intended as
“one means to control the majority from those acts to which they might
be otherwise inclined.” 140
Referring to judicial enforcement, he added:
If [the amendments] are incorporated into the constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution
by the declaration of rights. 141

The Preamble to the Bill of Rights codifies this understanding; it
specifies that the Bill of Rights’ “declaratory and restrictive clauses” are
intended to “prevent misconstruction or abuse” of the government’s
powers. 142 As Frederick Schauer explains, the Constitution and Bill of
Rights were enacted both to “keep[] bad people from doing bad things,”
as well as to “keep[] good people from doing good things, in the service
of higher or longer-term goals.” 143 They identify various areas of
138 Kontorovich also relies on the Third Amendment to bolster his thesis that most constitutional
rights are not protected by property rules. Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A
Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1164. The Third Amendment
provides that, “[i]n peacetime, quartering of troops can only be done with ‘the consent of the
Owner.’” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. III). He contends that this provision’s express reference to
the landowner’s consent implicitly creates a property rule “entitl[ing] [her] to equitable relief” against
violations. Id. at 1164. Kontorovich concludes that the Constitution’s “failure to stipulate consent as a
necessary condition for transfers of other entitlements . . . suggests that the Constitution does not
presume property rule protection” for other rights. Id. at 1170. This argument appears to be reading
too much into the Third Amendment’s selective use of the word “consent.” A warrantless
unreasonable search would violate the Fourth Amendment, for example, just as much as quartering
troops in peacetime without a homeowner’s consent would violate the Third Amendment. Injunctive
relief should be equally available in both cases.
139 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
140 Id. at 455.
141 Id. at 457.
142 U.S. CONST. Bill of Rights pmbl., available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/
bill_of_rights_transcript.html (last visited June 21, 2014).
143 Frederick Schauer, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881, 1896 (2013).
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personal freedom that may not be balanced against other interests on an
ad hoc basis to maximize social utility or promote other collective
goals. 144 Nothing in the debates surrounding the Constitution or Bill of
Rights suggests that the framers intended their provisions (other than
the Takings Clause) to be conditional guarantees of financial
compensation rather than prohibitions on certain types of government
conduct.
c. Double-Counting the Public Interest
The Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars’ theory also would lead
courts to double-count the public interest when determining whether
the government may perform certain acts. Supreme Court doctrine
requires courts to take the public interest into account in various ways at
the liability stage of many constitutional cases. For example, courts must
weigh the public interest to determine the constitutionality of ballot
access requirements, 145 restrictions on commercial speech, 146 and even
many types of searches under the Fourth Amendment. 147 A court also
considers the public interest to determine whether a person’s
constitutional rights are outweighed by compelling governmental
interests that cannot be achieved through more narrowly tailored
means. 148
Once a court has determined that a constitutional violation has
occurred, it should not be permitted to take the public interest into
account yet again at the remedies stage to determine whether the
plaintiff’s entitlement should be protected only by a liability rule—
meaning the government may engage in the otherwise prohibited
conduct, so long as it compensates the plaintiff—or a property rule.
Such repeated consideration of the public interest would tip the scales
too heavily against enforcement of individual rights. Moreover, if public
interest considerations are insufficiently weighty to prevent recognition
144 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 99–100 (1977); see also ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–33 (1974) (characterizing rights as “side constraints” on
government power); cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part) (“[I]n a democracy like our own . . . the autonomy of each individual is accorded equal and
incommensurate respect.”).
145 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“A court considering a challenge to a
state election law must weigh . . . ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule[.]’” (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983))).
146 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(“The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.
Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest.”).
147 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (“In delineating the constitutional
safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court has weighed the public interest against the
Fourth Amendment interest of the individual.”); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979)
(holding that courts must consider “the degree to which [a] seizure advances the public interest” in
determining its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment).
148 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–21 (2000).
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of a right at the liability stage, there seems to be no basis for allowing
them to preclude enforcement of that right at the remedies stage.
d. Structural Implications
A final concern with the Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars’
approach is that much of their reasoning seems to apply with equal
force to many of the Constitution’s structural provisions. For example,
as discussed above, Kontorovich argues that, even though the
Constitution’s rights-related provisions are “phrased as absolute
prohibitions on governmental conduct,” the Constitution’s text “leaves
remedies [for violations] open to legislative experimentation.” 149 Thus,
he contends that constitutional rights should be enforced solely through
liability rules when allowing the government to perform the otherwise
proscribed acts would further important public interests and the
transaction costs of negotiating voluntary waivers would be
prohibitive. 150
It appears, however, that this reasoning would equally allow the
government to ignore structural constraints on its power in order to
avoid transaction costs and promote the public interest, so long as it
compensates states or individuals who are adversely affected by its
actions. Congress would be able to commandeer state officials, 151 rather
than relying on their voluntary participation in federal programs; 152
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity through its Article I powers, 153
rather than persuading states to voluntarily waive their immunity;154
and even coerce state legislatures into passing certain laws, 155 rather
than attempting to induce them to do so through constitutionally
permissible means of persuasion. 156 In each of these scenarios, the
government could contend that “condemnation” of states’
constitutional prerogatives (upon payment of appropriate
compensation, of course) is necessary because holdout problems and

149 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 814.
150 Id.
151 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914 (1997); see also New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to . . . administer a federal
regulatory program.”).
152 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 923 n.12 (noting that “voluntary state participation” in the
administration or enforcement of federal programs is permissible, because it “significantly reduces
the ability of Congress to . . . reduc[e] the power of the Presidency”).
153 Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65–66 (1996).
154 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999) (“[W]e have not questioned the general
proposition that a State may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit.”).
155 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012).
156 See New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (“[T]he Federal Government [may] . . . hold out incentives to
the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes.”); see, e.g., South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
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adverse selection would prevent the government from achieving its
goals through voluntary negotiations with them.
To take an extreme example, one might even imagine Congress
extending a sitting President’s term for a few extra years (perhaps to
preserve continuity during an ongoing war and avoid partisan
campaigning against the Commander in Chief), upon payment of a
small sum to each registered voter to compensate for the temporary loss
of their 1/153,157,000 voice in selecting the President. 157 Once “pliability
rules” are recognized as a valid means of enforcing constitutional
provisions that do not expressly specify a means of enforcement, there
does not appear to be a persuasive basis for applying them exclusively to
the Constitution’s rights-related provisions.
Kontorovich addresses this point briefly in a footnote. He declares
that injunctive relief should be available to enforce the Constitution’s
separation-of-powers and federalism constraints because it is unclear
“how money damages would remedy violations [of such
constraints] . . . .or even to whom . . . damages would be paid.”158
Elsewhere in his discussion, however, Kontorovich downplays the
“difficulty of objectively valuing” constitutional entitlements. 159 Despite
the absence of tort-law analogues to separation-of-power and federalism
violations to provide a baseline for calculating damages, 160 courts likely
would be able to determine the tangible harm, if any, that they cause to
states and individuals, and perhaps add a premium to compensate for
the intangible aspects of the harm. 161
The point, of course, is not that courts should establish liabilityrule protections for structural constitutional provisions, but rather that
the Constitutional Liability Rule Scholars’ approach to constitutional
remedies seems to apply to many such provisions, as well. This reductio
ad absurdum argument undermines the validity of their proposed
interpretation of the Constitution’s rights-related provisions. Thus, for
all of these reasons, constitutional rights—as well as the Constitution’s
structural provisions—should be enforceable ex ante through
injunctions, rather than exclusively ex post through liability or
“pliability” rules.

157 See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2012: Table. 4a. Reported Voting and
Registration of the Citizen Voting-Age Population, for States: November 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2012/tables.html
(last
updated May 8, 2013).
158 Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note
102, at 760 n.8.
159 Id. at 773.
160 Cf. id. at 760 n.8.
161 Cf. id. at 774. But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978).
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The Right to Seek Injunctive Relief Is Insufficient

The availability of ex post damages is not the only reason why
scholars generally downplay the significance of injunctive relief in
public law cases. Many commentators reason that government officials
contemplating conduct that may violate a statutory or constitutional
right do so in the shadow of the law, particularly judicial rulings
concerning that right. 162 When a court rules for a plaintiff in a public
law case without issuing an injunction, its judgment and written
opinion recognizing a right typically are sufficient to enable rightholders
within that jurisdiction to obtain injunctions to prevent violations of
that right. Recognizing the likely outcome of such potential litigation,
government actors within that jurisdiction will refrain from attempting
to violate the right, as if the court had issued an injunction.
Such reasoning abstracts away from the actual functioning of the
judicial system, particularly the transaction costs of obtaining injunctive
relief. This Section challenges the widely accepted practice—built into
Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral framework 163—of treating a
declaratory judgment or written opinion recognizing a right as
effectively equivalent to an actual injunction. It demonstrates that an
injunction provides a significantly higher level of protection for public
law rights than either of those alternatives.
First, injunctions allow rightholders to avoid administrative
exhaustion requirements that otherwise might frustrate their ability to
enforce rights recognized in judicial opinions. Many agencies that
nonacquiesce to judicial rulings with which they disagree 164 require
adversely affected people to exhaust internal appellate processes before
challenging their actions in court. 165 These processes often involve
multiple rounds of review and can take years. Especially during the
Reagan Administration, the Social Security Administration (SSA) was
particularly notorious for leveraging exhaustion requirements 166 to
allow it to ignore circuit court rulings when dealing with residents of the
very circuits that issued them. 167

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9.
164 See infra Part I.D.
165 See Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1339, 1403–04 (1991); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and
Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1818 (1989).
166 See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764–65 (1975).
167 See Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for
Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 399, 401 (1989); Ann Ruben, Note, Social
Security Administration in Crisis: Non-Acquiescence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 89, 114–
15 (1986).
162
163
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As the Ninth Circuit explained, when an agency with exhaustion
requirements acts contrary to a purportedly binding judicial opinion
that interprets or invalidates a statute or regulation:
If . . . a claimant has the determination and the financial and physical
strength and lives long enough to make it through the administrative
process, he can turn to the courts and ultimately expect them to
apply the law as announced [by the Ninth Circuit]. If exhaustion
overtakes him and he falls somewhere along the road leading to such
ultimate relief, the nonacquiescence and the resulting [agency
decision] stand. 168

In contrast, when a court issues an injunction to a plaintiff class169
that requires an agency to interpret a statute or regulation in a particular
manner, and the agency persists in applying its own contrary
interpretation, adversely affected individuals may circumvent
administrative exhaustion requirements and pursue immediate judicial
relief through summary contempt proceedings. Historically, class
actions for injunctive relief have been one of the most effective means of
defeating persistent agency nonacquiescence. 170
Second, a person protected by an injunction also is better able to
deter “fast-moving” constitutional violations 171 in which the rightholder
is unable to get to court to obtain emergency relief before the violation
occurs. For example, if police confronted a passerby and demanded to
search her, or sought to enter a home without a warrant, the rightholder
would be unable to obtain an injunction in time to stop the violation,
even if prior judicial opinions made it likely that the court would issue
one.
A person protected by an injunction—whether she obtained it on
her own or was covered as a member of a successful plaintiff class—
would be able to threaten the officer with civil or criminal contempt. A
person who is not protected by an injunction, in contrast, could only
threaten to seek an injunction against future violations, which would
not apply to the pending situation, and ex post damages, which often are
ineffective in deterring constitutional violations. 172 Injunctions,
therefore, provide more effective protection against fast-moving
Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1439–40 (9th Cir. 1983).
The court could choose to limit the class to residents of its judicial district or circuit. See, e.g.,
Shvartsman v. Apfel, 138 F.3d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1998); Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 161, 163 (6th
Cir. 1976); see also infra Part III.C.
170 See, e.g., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455,
1460–62 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986);
Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 31–32 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 725 F.2d 1489
(9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
171 Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of
Constitutional Remedies, supra note 102, at 1178–79.
172 See supra Part I.B.
168
169

MORLEY.35.6 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

PUBLIC LAW AT THE CATHEDRAL

8/1/2014 8:05 PM

2483

statutory or constitutional violations than either a declaratory judgment
or the mere right to seek injunctive relief.
Third, as a practical matter, an injunction is likely to have a much
greater psychological impact on government officials than a judicial
opinion in the Federal Reporter. 173 A court order prohibits specifically
identified government officials or a particular agency from performing
certain acts or applying a legal provision in certain ways. Government
actors may find it much harder to ignore such an order than a
comparable ruling contained in a judicial opinion.
Finally, government actors may have political incentives to
continue engaging in constitutional or statutory violations until a court
compels them to stop. As Levinson and Karlan explain, politically active
voters and interest groups sometimes support policymakers’ decisions
to undermine or nonacquiesce to certain public law rights. 174 Public
officials may find it politically valuable to be able to claim that they are
being forced, against their will, to uphold or respect an unpopular
public law right, and that they have exhausted all possible means of
opposing its enforcement. 175 Thus, unless and until a litigant actually
obtains an injunction carrying the possibility of civil or criminal
contempt, ignoring courts’ interpretations of the law may further an
official’s professional interests and ideological preferences.
D.

Agency Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions

Practical experience buttresses the previous Sections’ theoretical
analysis. When courts do not issue injunctions in public law cases,
government agencies sometimes nonacquiesce to rulings with which
they disagree.176 A nonacquiescing agency will implement the court’s
judgment for the plaintiff or claimant in the case the court decided, but
refuses to apply the court’s interpretation or opinion in other, future
proceedings, instead applying its own, contrary interpretation of the
legal provisions at issue.
An exhaustive, albeit dated, academic study of agency
nonacquiescence concludes that is a “widespread practice in the
American governmental system.” 177 A survey prepared for the
173 The impact might be comparable to that of a declaratory judgment, although an injunction
typically is drafted in more imperative or prohibitory terms.
174 See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
175 Cf. Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 203, 271 (1987) (discussing agency officials’ incentives to enter into consent decrees).
176 See infra notes 179–86.
177 Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of
Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 537 (1986); see also William Wade Buzbee, Note, Administrative
Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 584–89 (1985) (describing the
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Administrative Conference of the United States a few years later
confirms that numerous agencies engage in the practice. 178 Among the
federal agencies with official nonacquiescence policies are the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 179 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 180
Social Security Administration (SSA), 181 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 182 Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Merit Systems Protection
intracircuit nonacquiescence practices of three agencies).
178 Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies,
98 YALE L.J. 679, 692–718 (1989).
179 D.L. Baker, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 515, 529 n.42 (2007) (“The Board generally applies its
‘nonacquiescence policy,’ and instructs its administrative law judges to follow Board precedent, not
court of appeals precedent, unless overruled by the United States Supreme Court.” (citation omitted)
(citing, inter alia, Arvin Indus., 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 757 (1987))); see also SF Mkts., LLC, 198 L.R.R.M.
1816, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 108, at *20 (Feb. 18, 2014) (“[T]he Board generally applies a
‘nonacquiescence policy’ to appellate court decisions that conflict with Board law, and instructs its
administrative law judges to follow Board precedent, not court of appeals precedent.” (citation
omitted)). See generally Scott Kafker, Nonacquiescence by the NLRB: Combat Versus Collaboration,
3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987).
180 For the IRS:
Nonacquiescence signifies that, although no further review was sought, the Service does
not agree with the holding of the court and generally, will not follow the decision in
disposing of cases involving other taxpayers. In reference to an opinion of a circuit court
of appeals, a nonacquiescence indicates that the Service will not follow the holding on a
nationwide basis. . . . [but] will recognize the precedential impact of the opinion on cases
arising within the venue of the deciding circuit.
IRM 4.10.7.2.9.8.1(4)(C) (Jan. 1, 2006); see, e.g., AOD 2013-12, 2013 AOD LEXIS 2 (Mar. 18, 2013)
(nonacquiescing in Zapara v. Comm’r, 652 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2011)); accord Actions Relating to
Decisions of the Tax Court, 2008-9 I.R.B. 481, 481, 2008 IRB LEXIS 1575, at *2–3 (Mar. 3, 2008). In
practice, however, it appears that the IRS is willing to engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence. See,
e.g., AOD 2011-44, 2011 AOD LEXIS 2, at *3–4 (Oct. 31, 2011) (nonacquiescing in Keller v. Comm’r,
556 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), “including [in] cases appealable to the Ninth Circuit” (emphasis
added)).
181 SSA policy provides:
In the absence of an instruction to apply court of appeals holdings to the cases before
them, SSA adjudicators are obliged to apply agency policy and agency interpretations of
the law. In matters of law and policy, the Agency head has primacy. An [Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ)] is bound to follow Agency policy even if, in the ALJ’s opinion, the policy
is contrary to law.
Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel, SSA, Legal Foundations of the Duty of
Impartiality in the Hearing Process and Its Applicability to Administrative Law Judges 5–6 (Jan. 28,
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoted in Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a New
Independent Adjudication Agency to Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security
Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 300 (2003)).
182 The EEOC’s Administrative Law Judges’ handbook provides, “When there is a conflict
between the Commission’s position and that of the Circuit Court in the jurisdiction where the
Administrative Judge sits, an Administrative Judge must follow Commission policy, but may
acknowledge that the Circuit Court has reached a different conclusion.” EEOC, HANDBOOK FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, ch. 2, § III (2002); see, e.g., Montemorra v. Snow, No. 01A41536, 2005
WL 1936122, at *3 n.4 (EEOC Aug. 2, 2005); see also Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War:
The Ongoing Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 MO. L.
REV. 949, 973–76 (2009).
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Board (MSPB), 183 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 184 and
the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission (OHSRC), 185
among others. 186 Many of these policies expressly authorize intracircuit
nonacquiescence, permitting agency personnel to disregard a circuit
court’s opinions even in matters that arise within that circuit. 187 As
noted earlier, injunctions have been the most effective method of
defeating persistent agency nonacquiescence—at least where courts have
been willing to issue them. 188
Perhaps the most extreme examples of nonacquiescence arose from
SSA during the Reagan Administration. In 1984, SSA denied 900,000
applications for disability benefits, often in direct violation of binding
precedent due to SSA’s nonacquiescence with the law of the circuit. 189
Claimants represented by counsel were better able to exhaust
administrative remedies and press their claims in the courts, which
would apply the legally correct—and much more favorable—
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 178, at 718; see also id. at 713–14.
See, e.g., In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214 [1984–85 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,801, 87,592, 87,596 n.8 (July 8, 1985) (expressing nonacquiescence in
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Peter J. Rooney, Nonacquiescence by
the Securities and Exchange Commission: Its Relevance to the Nonacquiescence Debate, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1111 (1992) (discussing the difficulties of identifying and preventing informal nonacquiescence
by the SEC).
185 See, e.g., S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 659
F.2d 1273, 1278–79 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that the OSHRC “decline[s] to follow decisions of the
courts of appeals with which it disagrees, even in cases arising in those circuits”).
186 See, e.g., ITT World Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (overturning the
FCC’s decision to apply reasoning contained in a dissenting opinion, with which the FCC agreed,
rather than binding Second Circuit law).
187 Buzbee, supra note 177, at 583–84. Intercircuit nonacquiescence, in contrast, is the refusal to
apply one circuit’s ruling in other jurisdictions. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 178, at 687. Most
scholars believe that intracircuit nonacquiescence is unconstitutional, or otherwise should be
prohibited in most or all circumstances, because it allows an agency to apply different law to a person
or matter than a court of competent jurisdiction would apply. Coenen, supra note 165, at 1346, 1412;
Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of
Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Schwartz, supra note 165, at 1904;
cf. Buzbee, supra note 177, at 604–08 (arguing that intracircuit nonacquiescence should be
permissible in certain narrow circumstances); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 178, at 743 (arguing
that intracircuit nonacquiescence “can be justified only as an interim measure that allows the agency
to maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute while it makes reasonable attempts to
persuade the courts to validate its position”). But see Maranville, supra note 177, at 537–38 (arguing
that nonacquiescence has negative consequences, but does not violate constitutional or other
doctrines).
Most scholars generally regard intercircuit nonacquiescence, in contrast, as permissible,
because a circuit’s precedents typically are not binding outside of its geographic jurisdiction,
nonmutual collateral estoppel generally is unavailable against the government, and the Supreme
Court has recognized the value of allowing government entities to re-litigate legal issues in multiple
courts. Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 71–75 (2003); Estreicher &
Revesz, supra note 178, at 735–41; see also United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159–60 (1984).
188 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
189 Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 996
(1987).
183
184
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standards. 190 They “almost always” prevailed. 191 “Those disability
claimants—about 650,000 in 1984 alone—who d[id] not appeal ha[d]
their claims decided by the executive pursuant to far less favorable
standards.”192
Agencies may nonacquiesce expressly, by publishing prospectively
applicable notices or acknowledging their nonacquiescence in written
opinions from administrative adjudications, 193 or silently, by simply
refusing to incorporate district or circuit court rulings into internal
policies, procedures, and guidance documents for agency personnel. 194
Even police departments sometimes, in effect, nonacquiesce to judicial
rulings by continuing to enforce laws—typically quality-of-life
provisions—that have been held unconstitutional. For example, the
Ithaca, New York, police department continued to enforce a state
loitering law 195 two decades after the New York Court of Appeals struck
it down. 196 Disturbingly, the Second Circuit concluded that an
individual who was wrongly arrested under this invalid law could not
even seek compensatory damages against the arresting officers. 197
Similarly, New York City police officers detained, arrested, or issued
summonses to the same woman on over ten occasions for baring her
breasts in public, 198 despite the fact that the state’s highest court had
ruled years earlier that such conduct was legal. 199
Police may choose to arrest violators under unconstitutional laws,
even though any prosecutions would be doomed to failure, because
many arrests are made “to advance some other goal.” 200 As criminal
procedure scholar and former police officer Seth Stoughton notes,
police may arrest a person without regard to the possible success of a
criminal prosecution to punish him for being insufficiently respectful to
the officer, end a potentially disruptive or uncomfortable situation,
“facilitate the delivery of noncriminal social services” to the arrestee, or
any number of other reasons. 201
Thus, as an empirical matter, a court’s failure to issue injunctive
relief in public law cases facilitates agency nonacquiescence. Although
Id.
Id.
192 Id. at 996–97.
193 Maranville, supra note 177, at 476–78.
194 Id. at 480–84.
195 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(3) (McKinney 2014).
196 Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing People v. Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62
(N.Y. 1983) (Mem.)).
197 Id. at 526.
198 J. David Goodman, Topless Woman? Move On, Police Are Told, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2013, at
A21.
199 People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992).
200 Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 881 (2014).
201 Id. at 881–82; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 437 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965).
190
191
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an injunction cannot guarantee that governmental actors will comply
with a court’s rulings, it provides greater protection for public law rights
than a court opinion or declaratory judgment alone. An injunction
reduces the transaction costs for rightholders to seek judicial
enforcement of their rights, gives public officials additional “cover” for
taking unpopular actions to uphold them, and exacerbates the potential
consequences for government actors considering violating them. It is
likely to have the greatest impact when government officials disagree
with a court’s ruling and (i) high transaction costs otherwise may deter
rightholders from seeking judicial assistance in enforcing their rights
(such as where administrative exhaustion requirements exist or the
threatened violation is “fast-moving”); or (ii) the benefits of violating
the right will accrue primarily to a substantial number of likely voters or
a broad coalition of interest groups, while violations are inflicted
primarily on members of unorganized or politically weak groups.
II. RENOVATING THE CATHEDRAL FOR PUBLIC LAW CASES
The Cathedral is one of the best-known and most enduring
frameworks for examining the relationship between rights and
remedies. It was developed in the private law context, however, and
must be modified to be applied usefully to public law. Section A
examines past attempts to apply the Cathedral framework to
constitutional rights. Section B proposes an expansion of the framework
that offers a more accurate and complete view of the various ways in
which the law may protect public law rights, both statutory and
constitutional.
The Cathedral framework uses the term “property rule”
indiscriminately in connection with two different groups of people:
those who hold an entitlement protected by an injunction, and those
who merely have a substantial likelihood of being able to obtain
injunctive relief against violations of that entitlement. 202 As the previous
Part demonstrated, however, there are important legal and practical
distinctions between these groups with regard to public law rights. As
applied to such rights, the concept of “property rule” should be
disaggregated to distinguish between a “complete property rule,” which
applies to an entitlement if the rightholder is protected by an injunction,
and a “potential property rule,” which applies to an entitlement if the
rightholder does not have an injunction, but rather has a substantial
likelihood of obtaining one from a court.

202

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Past Attempts to Apply the Cathedral Framework to Constitutional
Rights

Calabresi and Melamed explain that an entitlement may be
protected by either a “liability rule” or a “property rule.” 203 The type of
rule that protects an entitlement determines both the ex ante
circumstances under which that entitlement may be transferred, as well
as the range of potential ex post consequences if it is violated. 204 A third
party may violate an entitlement protected by a liability rule, without the
entitlement holder’s consent, so long as it pays the entitlement’s fair
market value (i.e., compensatory damages). 205 The entitlement holder
may not prevent third parties from violating the entitlement, but rather
may insist only on receiving an objectively determined amount of
compensation. 206
A property rule, in contrast, gives an entitlement holder the formal
legal right to prevent third parties from violating his entitlement ex
ante. 207 An entitlement protected by a property rule cannot be
transferred to a third party without the entitlement holder’s consent. 208
Thus, property rules generally are thought to confer more effective or
complete protection for entitlements than liability rules. 209 As
203 They explain that entitlements also may be protected by an “inalienability rule.” Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 9, at 1093, 1111. An inalienability rule is similar to a property rule, except the
entitlement holder is not permitted to transfer, sell, give away, or otherwise divest himself of the
underlying entitlement. Id. at 1092. From the perspective of a potential violator, an inalienability rule
and property rule are effectively equivalent, because each prohibits involuntary transfers of an
entitlement.
204 This Article uses the term “violation” to refer broadly to the violation, transfer, seizure, or
destruction of a legal entitlement.
205 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092. When an entitlement is protected only by a
liability rule, interesting conceptual questions arise as to whether a third party who violates that
entitlement, but adequately compensates the holder, has violated the holder’s rights. On one view, the
right to damages under a liability rule is solely a remedy, arising only if the underlying entitlement is
violated. Alternatively, the entitlement itself can be reconceptualized as the right to either have a third
party perform or refrain from performing certain acts or be paid a certain amount of money. See Ian
Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106
YALE L.J. 703, 704 (1996) (reframing a liability rule as an option that grants others the right to “take
an entitlement nonconsensually and pay the entitlement owner some exercise price”). On this view, a
third party may select either alternative without violating the entitlement holder’s rights. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1133 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] contract gives a party two
equally viable options (perform or pay compensation), between which it is generally at liberty to
choose.”). The Cathedral framework, with its careful distinction between entitlements and the rules
protecting them, seems to presuppose the first view, but a complete analysis of the issue is left for
future work.
206 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory
Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 709 (2005) (“[A] property rule, when available, provides the fullest
measure of protection for owners’ right to resist the government.”); see also Saul Levmore, Unifying
Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2153 n.10 (1997)
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mentioned earlier, a “property rule” is conventionally said to protect an
entitlement regardless of whether the entitlement holder is actually
protected by an injunction, or instead simply has a substantial
likelihood of obtaining one from a court. 210
A person who violates an entitlement protected by a property rule
generally faces ex post consequences beyond the mere payment of
compensatory damages. Calabresi and Melamed call these additional
consequences an “undefinable kicker,” which “represents society’s need
to keep all property rules from being changed at will into liability
rules.” 211 Depending on the context, they may include civil or criminal
contempt, punitive damages, double or treble damages, or potentially
even imprisonment. The consequences for violations of property rules
are supposedly “set at such a high level that they would in theory deter
all takings of entitlements without the owner’s consent.” 212
One of the Cathedral’s authors, A. Douglas Melamed, noted in a
later work that the Article “address[es] issues of private law,” and
opined that “it is worth exploring the property rule/liability rule issue in
the context of public law. The property rule/liability rule framework
might be a useful metaphor with which to view larger issues about the
role of government.”213 Several commentators have taken up Melamed’s
challenge to apply the Cathedral framework to the public law realm,
employing comparable, though not identical, approaches. 214 The chart
below synthesizes the conventional theories of how the Cathedral
framework maps onto constitutional law:

(Because “judicial ‘error’ associated with assessing damages may be virtually inevitable, or simply not
designed to provide full compensation, . . . it is possible to think of liability rules as less ‘complete’
remedies than property rules.”).
210 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
211 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1126.
212 Smith, supra note 10, at 1720; see also Ayres & Balkin, supra note 205, at 705 (“Property rules
are liability rules with an exercise price so high that the option is almost never taken.”).
213 A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE L.J. 2209, 2209, 2213
(1997); see also Levmore, supra note 209, at 2151 (noting that the Cathedral framework does not
“include remedies for . . . burdensome unconstitutional statutes”); cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 9, at 1089 (explaining that the Cathedral framework is intended to unify the private law areas of
property and torts).
214 See Baker, supra note 102, at 444–46; Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights:
The Case of Mass Detentions, supra note 102, at 762–65; Merrill, supra note 102, at 1151–53
(incorporating inalienability rules into the framework); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66 (1986) (focusing on takings).
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Individual
Government

Entity to Which Entitlement Is Allocated

Table 1
Type of Protection
Entitlement Receives
Property Rule
Liability Rule
Rule 1 – A person may obtain an
Rule 2 – The government may
injunction to stop the
violate a person’s entitlement if it
government from violating his
pays compensation.
entitlement.
Example: Most constitutional
rights.

Example: Real property subject to
eminent domain under the
Takings Clause.

Rule 3 – The government may
prevent people from performing
an act (or require them to do
something), and impose penalties
for noncompliance beyond
compensatory damages.

Rule 4 – The government may
prevent people from performing
an act (or require them to do
something), but a person may act
contrary to the government’s
decision by paying compensation.

Example: Most exercises of
government powers that do not
violate constitutional
restrictions. 215

Example: None, as a constitutional
matter. For statutory rights, any
law that allows a person to
purchase a permit to engage in
otherwise unlawful conduct or
requires violators to pay only
compensation. 216

Most scholars assume that nearly all rights conferred by the Bill of
Rights (except for the Takings Clause) are protected by property rules,
because a person may seek an injunction to prevent the government
from violating them. 217 Rule 1 reflects this conventional view.
215 Although the government may restrict certain types of speech, the First Amendment’s ban on
prior restraints often precludes it from obtaining ex ante injunctions against prohibited speech. See
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553 (1993). Therefore, unlike most other governmental
powers, its entitlement to restrict such speech may not be protected by a complete property rule.
216 From a purely economic perspective, buying a permit and paying damages or a civil fine are
largely equivalent. Buying a permit (for example, paying an entry fee for a public park or obtaining a
driver’s license) legitimates a person’s performance of certain acts, however, while paying an ex post
fine of the same amount does not. See generally Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1523, 1552 (1984).
217 See supra notes 11–12. Professor Ryan emphasizes that some constitutional provisions are
instead protected by inalienability rules which offer the same protection as property rules, with the
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The Expanded Cathedral Framework

The main problem with the Cathedral framework as typically
applied to public law cases is that it uses the term “property rule” to
refer to two different groups of people: those who already are protected
by an injunction, and those who instead have a substantial likelihood of
being able to obtain an injunction from a court. 218 This approach masks
the true impact of procedural rules, jurisdictional restrictions, and
ancillary doctrines on the legal effects of courts’ public law rulings. The
Cathedral framework should be expanded, at least in public law cases, to
distinguish between “complete property rules,” which apply to a person
whose entitlement is protected by an injunction, and “potential property
rules,” which apply to a person who has a substantial likelihood of being
able to obtain an injunction if she goes to court. 219 The chart below
reflects this proposed expanded Cathedral framework for public law
rights:

added limitation that the entitlement holder may not transfer or waive them. Ryan, supra note 87, at
5.
218 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
219 The model could further be clarified by adding a fourth rule category, for which there is no
private-law analogue, to reflect the special type of protection that exclusionary rules provide for the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914); the Fifth Amendment right against involuntary self-incrimination, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966); and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964).
An exclusionary rule is not a property rule because it cannot be invoked ex ante to prevent a
violation, and does not seek to punish government actors ex post. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
916 (1984). Instead, exclusionary rules are best seen as “quasi-liability” rules that put a rightholder in
nearly the same position in which he would have been if the unconstitutional search or interrogation
had not occurred. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n.10 (1968); see also Louis Michael
Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J.
2281, 2297–99 (1998). See generally William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 636 (1983)
(“[T]he principal role of the exclusionary rule should be to restore victims of those unconstitutional
searches and seizures that yield incriminating evidence to the position they were in before the
illegality occurred.”). Although the Supreme Court has vigorously opposed this characterization of
the exclusionary rule, see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n.29 (1976), it appears descriptively
accurate.
The exclusionary rule is not a full liability rule, however, because the Court has recognized
numerous exceptions under which the government may use illegally seized evidence for various
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (holding that illegally seized
evidence may be used for impeachment); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (same
for grand jury proceedings). Also, the government need not return contraband discovered pursuant
to an unconstitutional search. See, e.g., United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 433 (9th
Cir. 1987). The Cathedral framework could be further tweaked to reflect this unique constitutional
remedy.
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Table 2
Potential
Property Rule

Complete
Property Rule

The rightholder has a
substantial likelihood
of being able to
obtain an injunction
against violations of
the entitlement.

The rightholder
may seek civil and
criminal contempt
penalties against
those who violate
her entitlement.

The rightholder is entitled
to compensatory damages
(and possibly punitive
damages) for violations of
her entitlement.

Constitutional and
statutory rights:
This rule applies
when a person’s
entitlement is
protected by an
injunction.

Constitutional rights: This
rule applies by default
against violations by
counties and
municipalities, but under
narrow circumstances. It
applies against government
officials and employees
only if an opinion or
declaratory judgment from
a court of the appropriate
level “clearly establishes”
the right.

Individual

Constitutional rights:
This rule protects
most constitutional
rights by default.
Statutory rights: This
rule protects a
statutory right by
default unless the
statute provides only
for damages.

Liability /
Liability-Plus Rule

Statutory rights: This rule
applies if a statute allows
rightholders to seek
damages.
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Federal law permits
the government to
seek an injunction
against, or criminally
prosecute, a person to
prevent her from
performing an act
that the government
has the constitutional
power to prohibit.

The government
has obtained an
injunction or conviction against a
person who was
performing, or was
going to perform,
an act that the
government has
the constitutional
power to prohibit.

2493

The government exercises
its constitutional power to
restrict or prohibit an act,
but permits people who pay
a compensatory fee (or,
perhaps, a civil penalty) to
perform it.

Unlike the conventional Cathedral framework, this variation
presents the different rules that may protect rights as partially
cumulative, rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives. For example,
a person’s entitlement may be protected by both a complete property
rule, because she has an injunction, and a liability rule, because the law
is clearly established enough to allow her to seek damages. Likewise, a
person’s entitlements may be protected by different types of rules
against different potential violators. If an injunction runs against only
officials of a certain county, for example, then rightholders who fall
within the injunction would enjoy complete property-rule protection
against only those officials.
By default, a potential property rule protects most constitutional
and statutory rights against violations by government officials of any
level (except for rights under the Takings Clause or statutes that limit a
rightholder only to damages). This means that the rightholder has a
substantial likelihood of being able to obtain an injunction against
impending or ongoing violations. 220
Due to qualified immunity, a liability rule generally does not
protect a constitutional right against violations by public officials and
employees unless a judicial opinion “clearly establishes” it. 221 There are
220 If procedural or jurisdictional doctrines preclude a plaintiff from obtaining an injunction, see
infra Part III, and the rightholder cannot seek damages, then the claimed right is not protected by any
rule at all. Compare Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing that a constitutional right may exist,
even if a person has no means of judicially enforcing it), with Levinson, supra note 108 (arguing that
a claimed entitlement is not a right unless there is some means of enforcing it). Sovereign immunity
generally prevents a rightholder from seeking any form of relief, including an injunction, directly
against the federal government or the states themselves, as entities. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
475 (1994); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781, 781–82 (1978).
221 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (11th Cir.
2002).
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very few circumstances in which the plain text of a constitutional
provision or a general holding in a precedent is considered enough, on
its own, to “clearly establish” the law. 222 When a right is clearly
established, the rightholder may be deemed protected against public
officials and employees by a “liability-plus rule” since, in addition to
compensatory damages, she also may seek punitive damages against
violators, and there is at least the theoretical possibility that the
government would criminally prosecute them. 223
A traditional liability rule protects constitutional rights against
violations by municipalities and counties, regardless of whether the law
is “clearly established,” because qualified immunity does not apply to
such entities. 224 Such local government units may be held liable only
under certain narrow circumstances, however, because they are not
subject to respondeat superior liability. 225 For statutory rights, whether
they are protected by a liability rule or potential property rule (or both)
depends on the remedies set forth in the statute itself.
When a district court adjudicates a constitutional or statutory issue
and does not issue an injunction, people within the court’s jurisdiction
remain protected by a potential property rule. If, in contrast, the court
issues an injunction, then those covered by it become protected by a
complete property rule against the potential violators to whom the
injunction applies, while others within the court’s jurisdiction remain
protected by a potential property rule. 226 If circuit precedent allows
district court rulings to “clearly establish” the law on an issue, then the
court’s ruling grants everyone within its jurisdiction liability-rule
protection (which, as discussed earlier, may be characterized instead as
“liability-plus” rule protection) against violations by all public officials,
as well.
The analysis is similar when a circuit court affirms the existence of
a right. If the court directs or affirms the issuance of an injunction, then
a complete property rule protects those covered by the injunction from
the officials or entities to whom the injunction applies. Anyone not
covered by the injunction remains protected by a potential property
See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997).
The possibility of seeking punitive damages does not, in itself, give rise to a property rule in
this context because it is not a mechanism for attempting to prevent a violation from occurring ex
ante. But see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
30 (1987) (associating punitive damages with property rules); see also David D. Haddock et al., An
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
224 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
225 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A liability rule, rather than a liability-plus rule, protects rightholders against
municipal and county action, because punitive damages are not available against such entities under
§ 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
226 Again, neither complete nor potential property-rule protection applies to rights under the
Takings Clause or statutes that allow a rightholder to seek only compensatory damages.
222
223
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rule. Everyone within the circuit court’s jurisdiction also becomes
protected by a liability rule (or liability-plus rule) against violations by
public officials, since the circuit court’s opinion clearly establishes the
law and allows rightholders to obtain compensatory damages, and
potentially even punitive damages.
This proposed modification of the Cathedral framework for public
law entitlements, which distinguishes between complete and potential
property rules, reflects the important differences between those who are
protected by an injunction and those who merely have a substantial
likelihood of obtaining one.
III. DETERMINING PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC LAW ENTITLEMENTS
Despite the importance of injunctive relief in public law cases,
several judicially-created doctrines make it harder for plaintiffs to obtain
injunctions in such suits than in other contexts. And a plaintiff’s ability
to obtain an injunction in a public law case often depends on
contingent, random, or substantively unjustified factors relating to the
lawsuit itself, rather than the substance of the underlying rights.
For decades since the Cathedral’s publication, scholars have argued
that the type of protection an entitlement receives should be based on
concerns such as economic efficiency, distributional equity, and
justice. 227 They focus on substantive considerations, rather than
procedural technicalities. This Part suggests a range of procedural
reforms that would make injunctive relief—complete property-rule
protection 228—available for public law rights on a more uniform,
consistent, substantively defensible basis.
A.

Posture of a Public Law Case

The manner in which a litigant raises a public law issue plays a
major role in determining the type of protection a court may afford her.
In a pre-enforcement challenge 229 or other lawsuit directly challenging a
government act or the proper interpretation or validity of a legal
provision, 230 a person generally may seek an injunction. 231 Likewise,
when a government entity sues a person civilly, he or she generally may
file a counterclaim seeking injunctive relief based on such issues.232
227
228
229
230
231
232

See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1089, 1092.
See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Brown v. Enter. Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2816 (2011).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
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There is no mechanism for seeking an injunction, however, based on
constitutional, interpretive, or other such issues raised in the context of
a criminal case. 233 Similarly, if a court recognizes or applies a public law
right in a lawsuit among private litigants, it may issue an injunction
binding those parties, their privies, and their associates, 234 but such
complete property-rule protection will not extend to conduct by anyone
else, including any government entities that did not choose to intervene
in the case. 235
In each of these cases, the court may resolve the public law issue in
the same manner, using the same reasoning. However, the court’s ability
to issue an injunction—that is, the availability of complete property-rule
protection—turns on essentially contingent aspects of the case’s
procedural posture. The types of factors that scholars contend should be
the basis for determining how an entitlement should be protected, such
as economic efficiency, equity, or other justice-related concerns, are not
considered.
Litigants wishing to raise public law issues in cases involving the
government, including criminal prosecutions and challenges to agency
action, 236 should be permitted to seek injunctive relief, through
counterclaims if necessary, subject to standing limitations. 237 Similarly,
when a litigant raises a public law issue in private litigation, the court
should join the agency responsible for administering, interpreting, or
enforcing the challenged legal provision as an additional party, 238 rather
than simply requiring the litigant to notify the government or affected
state. 239 These reforms would expand courts’ ability to issue injunctions
in appropriate public law cases regardless of their posture, allowing
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights to more consistently
receive complete property-rule protection.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11–12.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
235 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2012) (allowing the government to intervene in any lawsuit in which
the constitutionality of a federal law is questioned); FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1(a) (requiring parties
challenging the constitutionality of a legal provision to notify the appropriate governmental entity).
236 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 15(a) (permitting petitions for review to be filed with federal circuit
courts of appeals).
237 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). A voluminous body of literature critiques
standing restrictions. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 317 (1990);
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24 (1982);
Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 630–32, 642–43 (1983); see also Owen
M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1978).
238 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (standards for permissive joinder in general).
239 Cf. supra note 235. In the absence of any such agency, the litigant should be required to join
the U.S. Attorney General for federal statutes, the appropriate State Attorney General for state laws,
or a county or municipality for local enactments.
233
234
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Defendants Subject to Injunctive Relief

Procedural and jurisdictional rules also dictate the scope of
injunctive relief that courts may award in public law cases. An
injunction generally is enforceable only against the litigants to whom it
is directed (as well as their officers, agents, and anyone acting in “active
concert or participation” with them). 240 Rules limiting the government
entities which may be named as defendants in public law cases therefore
directly impact the extent of complete property-rule protection that
courts may provide for successful litigants’ rights.
Sovereign immunity bars a person from suing the government or a
federal agency without its consent, 241 while the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits a person from suing a state without either its consent242 or
congressional authorization under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 243 To circumvent these restrictions and seek an injunction
against allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise invalid federal or state
action, a person must sue the head of the agency involved in his official
capacity under Ex Parte Young. 244 The injunction would apply not only
to the agency head, but his agents and subordinates throughout the
agency. 245
Courts will not enforce an injunction, however, against
government agencies or officials which are neither named in the
injunction nor within the scope of Rule 65. 246 Thus, an injunction will
not cover employees of other agencies who are working independently
of the enjoined official; 247 a lawsuit against the Attorney General, for
example, will not provide complete property-rule protection against
agents of the Department of Homeland Security or law enforcement
officials within the Treasury Department.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
242 College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675–76
(1999).
243 Id. at 637.
244 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
245 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
246 See, e.g., Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1991) (declining to enforce an
injunction against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) because it “was
only mentioned parenthetically in what appears as an explanation of the funding source that [a
certain housing authority] would tap. More was needed as a prelude to saddling HUD with the pains
and penalties of contempt”); Illinois v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.2d 329, 333 (7th
Cir. 1985) (refusing to compel the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
reimburse the State of Illinois for therapeutic abortions under Medicaid, because an injunction that
required the state to fund such abortions could not be “used affirmatively to compel post hoc a nonparty to pay for the cost of its compliance”); cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279–80 (1990)
(reversing contempt finding against city council members for failure to comply with a consent decree
that had been issued against only the city as an entity).
247 See, e.g., Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 81 (D.D.C. 2003).
240
241
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In contrast, sovereign immunity does not protect counties and
municipalities from being sued directly as entities. By suing a county or
municipality, a person may obtain complete property-rule protection
against all of its agents and officials, regardless of the department or
agency for which they work. 248 Thus, sovereign immunity restrictions
determine whether a successful plaintiff may obtain relief against all
officials and employees of a government entity, or only certain ones.
Particularly since the interplay between sovereign immunity and Ex
Parte Young’s exception for suits against public officials acting in their
official capacities is generally considered a legal fiction, 249 the doctrinal
contours of sovereign immunity should not be permitted to affect the
extent to which a person can enforce her public law rights.
One reasonable solution, short of revisiting Young, would be to
amend Rule 65 so that an injunction against a government official sued
in her official capacity is treated as an injunction against the
governmental entity (i.e., the state or federal government) for which she
works, as well as its officials, agents, and employees. 250 This procedural
fix would minimize the substantive impact of the Young fiction without
unduly impairing legitimate governmental interests.
Such an amendment would not unfairly prejudice either the federal
government or the states. All federal and state officials are agents of the
governmental entity for which they work and ultimately accountable to
the President or the state’s governor. Moreover, federal or state officials
sued in their official capacities generally are represented by their
respective Attorney General’s office, regardless of the department to
which they belong. Effectively treating separate departments as
independent juridical entities therefore is both unnecessary and
inaccurate. An injunction against one agency head should be applicable
to other agencies of the same level of government.
C.

Plaintiff Class Certification

When a court issues an injunction in a public law case, the range of
people who are protected by it—and, thus, receive complete propertyrule protection for their entitlement—depends in part on whether the
court certified the case as a class action. Most class action suits seeking
See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979).
See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 12, at 1929; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity
“Exception”, 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 127 (1996); cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the Federal
Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436–37 (1962) (calling Ex
Parte Young a “false pretense” that “hide[s] the truth”).
250 It is debatable whether an injunction against an independent agency or its officials should
extend to “conventional” executive departments and officials, and vice versa. These recommendations
also might apply in a more limited fashion to state executive officials who are independently elected.
248
249
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injunctive relief against governmental defendants are brought under
Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when a defendant has “acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class.” 251
Many courts have crafted a common law “necessity doctrine,”
under which they refuse to certify Rule 23(b)(2) classes against
government entities. 252 The necessity doctrine provides that class
certification is inappropriate when “[n]o useful purpose would be
served by permitting [the] case to proceed as a class action.”253 Applying
this doctrine, courts often refuse to certify Rule 23(b)(2) classes in
public law cases, on the grounds that government agencies can be
expected to implement their rulings in good faith. 254 For the reasons
discussed throughout this Article, such an assumption is
unwarranted. 255
Courts’ liberal use of the necessity doctrine to defeat public law
class actions is not required by Supreme Court precedent. In Califano v.
Yamasaki, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to certify a
national class to seek relief against the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare. 256 It rejected the Secretary’s objection that certification
would “foreclos[e] adjudication by a number of different courts and
judges.”257
While it is debatable whether classes in public law cases should be
limited to residents of a particular district or circuit, or instead certified
on a nationwide basis, courts should be willing to follow one of those
routes when Rule 23’s requirements are met. 258 The judge-made
necessity doctrine unnecessarily limits the availability of complete
property-rule protection for public law entitlements based on dubious
assumptions.
D.

Non-Merits Requirements for Injunctive Relief

When a plaintiff brings a successful public law claim, a court may
decline to grant an injunction—i.e., refrain from granting complete
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
See generally Daniel Tenny, Note, There Is Always a Need: The “Necessity Doctrine” and Class
Certification Against Government Agencies, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019 n.8 (2005) (collecting
cases).
253 Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir.), vacating as moot 409 U.S. 815
(1972).
254 See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1357 (1st Cir. 1985).
255 See supra Part I.D.
256 442 U.S. 682, 702–03 (1979).
257 Id.
258 See Tenny, supra note 252, at 1032–33 (arguing that courts should certify Rule 23(b)(2) classes
in public law cases to allow everyone affected by the government’s allegedly improper conduct to be
able to enforce the judgment).
251
252
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property-rule protection—for a variety of “non-merits” reasons. 259 In
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court reaffirmed that a litigant
who has prevailed on the merits of her claim may not obtain a
permanent injunction unless she also establishes that: she has “suffered
an irreparable injury;” legal remedies, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate; the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant “warrant[s]” injunctive relief; and an injunction would not
“disserve[]” the “public interest.” 260
This four-prong standard applies to all cases in which a party seeks
an injunction, including statutory 261 and constitutional cases. 262 Indeed,
in Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court declared that “the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute ‘on its face’ does not in itself justify an
injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it.” 263 Historically,
some courts have effectively waived the first two requirements in
constitutional cases, presuming that violations of constitutional rights
inflict irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 264
Especially following eBay and Winter v. National Resources Defense
Council 265 (which reaffirmed similar requirements for preliminary
injunctions), however, many courts refuse to presume that those factors
are automatically satisfied. 266 Indeed, courts have even denied injunctive
relief in constitutional cases based on a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy
them. 267
The non-merits requirements for obtaining injunctive relief are
potentially formidable restrictions on a person’s ability to obtain
property-rule protection for statutorily or constitutionally protected
259 Cf. Morley, supra note 42 (discussing non-merits requirements for injunctive relief under
federal laws).
260 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
261 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (holding that nonmerits requirements for both preliminary and permanent injunctions apply in a case under the
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012), against the Navy).
262 See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930–32 (1975); see also Mark P. Gergen et al.,
The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
203, 215 n.52 (2012) (collecting cases).
263 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971); cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982).
264 Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell to Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in Constitutional
Litigation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 759 n.66 (2012) (collecting cases).
265 555 U.S. at 22.
266 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 681 n.14 (9th Cir. 2009) (criticizing district court for
relying on presumption of irreparable injury in First Amendment case); see also Hohe v. Casey, 868
F.2d 69, 72–73 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he assertion of First Amendment rights does not automatically
require a finding of irreparable injury . . . . Rather the plaintiffs must show a chilling effect on free
expression.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Town of W. Newbury, 835 F.2d
380, 382 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The alleged denial of procedural due process, without more, does not
automatically trigger . . . a finding [of irreparable harm].”).
267 Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283,
1286 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if
Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood of
irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper.”).
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interests. Winter, for example, arose under the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA), 268 which requires federal agencies to file an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before performing a major action
that will “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 269
In 2007, the Navy planned to perform antisubmarine sonar training that
it estimated would disrupt a few hundred whales each year, but did not
prepare an EIS. 270 The district court issued, and the Ninth Circuit
approved, a preliminary injunction against the Navy’s drills until it filed
an EIS. 271
The Supreme Court overturned the preliminary injunction,
holding that “the balance of equities and consideration of the overall
public interest in this case tip strongly in favor of the Navy.” 272 The
Court explained, “For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury
would be harm to an unknown number of the marine mammals that
they study and observe. In contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an
inadequately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes the safety of the
fleet.” 273 The Court determined that “[t]he public interest in conducting
training exercises with active sonar under realistic conditions plainly
outweighs the interests advanced by the plaintiffs.” 274 It added: “[I]t
would be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction, after
final decision on the merits, along the same lines as the preliminary
injunction.”275 Thus, a plaintiff’s ability to obtain an injunction can turn
on the non-merits requirements for injunctive relief, even when her
statutory or constitutional entitlements are being violated.
Many commentators have concluded that eBay’s non-merits
requirements impose inappropriate obstacles for plaintiffs seeking to
prevent constitutional violations ex ante. 276 Similarly, Professor Jared
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
270 Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 16 (2008).
271 Id. at 19.
272 Id. at 26.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 32.
276 A substantial amount of scholarship focuses specifically on the irreparable injury requirement.
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.5, at 86–101 (2d ed.
1993); FISS, supra note 1, at 91–92; Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated
Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1343, 1406 (2002). Other pieces critique the balance-of-hardships and public interest prongs.
See, e.g., Ryan Griffin, Note, Litigating the Contours of Constitutionality: Harmonizing Equitable
Principles and Constitutional Values When Considering Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 839, 855 (2010). For an overview of the literature critiquing equitable balancing, see Morley,
supra note 42.
One scholar defends the recent trend against presuming harm in constitutional cases, arguing:
268
269

The Supreme Court has never suggested that courts should approach the question of
injunctive relief differently in constitutional cases and has repeatedly emphasized the
irreparable injury element in that context. . . . Courts should not presume damages for
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Goldstein contends that applying the balance-of-interests factor in
statutory cases is “an assertion of naked judicial authority to choose
among competing federal policies.” 277 It “simply instructs judges that
they may issue an injunction if they think it will do more good than
harm, but the instruction to do good rather than bad is no rule.” 278 The
balance of hardships test “thus empowers courts to pick the statutory
interests they consider most important based on their own policy
preferences.”279 A variation on this point applies in the constitutional
context; the balance-of-hardships test requires courts to weigh
incommensurable values, determining whether the adverse practical
consequences of enforcing constitutional provisions justify permitting
violations to continue. 280
Most or all of the non-merits requirements for injunctive relief
should be relaxed or abandoned, at least in constitutional cases. Once a
plaintiff has proven a constitutional claim, the government should not
be permitted to exceed its constitutional authority to avoid hardship or
promote the public interest, or on the grounds that the plaintiff may
seek monetary damages after the fact. 281 The main reason government
actors are subject to constitutional restrictions is to remove certain
issues from the normal realm of debate over the public interest. 282
Moreover, as a matter of substantive law, the government generally
may abridge a person’s constitutional rights only for compelling reasons
that cannot be furthered through more narrowly tailored means. 283 The
non-merits requirements for injunctive relief, however, generally do not
rise to this level. Therefore, absent extraordinary circumstances, a court
should not be permitted to rely on them to deny injunctive relief and
allow constitutional violations to proceed. A similar analysis applies to
rights and restrictions set forth in federal statutes. 284

constitutional wrongs; why then should they presume irreparable harm? . . . The
presumption obscures the perhaps discomforting reality that many constitutional
infractions produce either no injury or one that damages can adequately redress.
DiSarro, supra note 264, at 745–46; see also Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L.
REV. 683 (2013) (arguing that courts should not give constitutional claims special treatment).
277 Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 517 (2010).
278 Id. at 523–24.
279 Id. at 524.
280 See, e.g., Steakhouse, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 166 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1999).
281 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 159 (2010) (“Congress has no power to act unless the
Constitution authorizes it to do so.”).
282 See supra Part I.B.3.
283 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993).
284 For a discussion of how the non-merits requirements should be modified in statutory cases, see
Morley, supra note 42.
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CONCLUSION
Actually having an injunction provides a significantly higher level
of protection for rightholders against illegal or unconstitutional conduct
than merely having a substantial likelihood of being able to obtain an
injunction or the right to seek ex post damages. Expanding the
Cathedral framework to distinguish between “potential property rules”
and “complete property rules” captures the importance of this
distinction and enhances the framework’s utility and accuracy as a
model of public law remedies.
Because of the importance of injunctive relief in public law cases,
courts should modify procedural, jurisdictional, and other ancillary
rules to ensure that plaintiffs litigating against government agencies and
officials are not at a special disadvantage in obtaining injunctions, and
that such relief is available on a wider, more consistent, and
substantively defensible basis. Such reforms will help limit the impact of
a case’s posture on the nature of the protection that a court provide for a
litigant’s rights, make litigants better able to deter public law violations,
and reduce agency nonacquiescence to judicial rulings.

